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The "Whale War" Between Japan and the
United States: Problems and Prospects
KAZUO SUMI*
I. PREFACE
Recently, the "whale war" between Japan and the United States has
resurfaced over the Japanese research whaling issue. On January 13, 1988,
sixteen major environmental groups in the United States filed a lawsuit
against the U.S. government "in an attempt to force economic sanctions
against Japan's fishing industry for its outlaw whaling."1 On January 27,
Representative Don Bonker introduced a Congressional Resolution to the
effect that "the United States should encourage other nations to impose
broad economic sanctions against nations which continue to whale in defi-
ance of the international moratorium." In submitting this Resolution to
the House of Representatives, he condemned the Japanese and Icelandic
research whaling and said as follows: "Under the guise of 'scientific re-
search', these nations plan to hunt and kill over 400 whales per year. This
'research whaling' is, of course, nothing more than a thinly-veiled effort to
continue their commercial whaling operations." He justified the Resolu-
tion by saying that "unfortunately, we have not worked to develop a uni-
fied multilateral front against whaling violations" and that "by encourag-
ing other nations to join with us, we will have a much more effective
penalty and spread the burden of enforcement across a larger group."'
In response to these movements, on February 10, 1988, Secretary of
Commerce, C. William Verity, recommended to the President the imposi-
tion of sanctions against Japan for killing whales under a Japanese re-
search program. The Secretary certified Japanese research whaling, as an
action that diminishes the effectiveness of the International Whaling
Commission's (IWC's) conservation program, under the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act.' Under the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, certification by the Secretary of Com-
merce results in an automatic fifty percent reduction in fish allocations in
the U.S. 200-mile zone. However, since Japan currently has no quotas in
the U.S. 200-mile zone, the sanctions are purely symbolic. Under the
Pelly Amendment, the President, upon receipt of certification by the Sec-
retary of Commerce, is authorized to embargo the importation of fish
products from the offending country.
* Kazuo Sumi is a Professor of International Law, Yokohama City University, Japan.
1. Greenpeace, News Release, Jan. 13, 1988, at 1.
2. Congressman Bonker, Bonker News (Congressional Pamphlet), Jan. 27, 1988, at 1.
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMERCE NEWS 1 (Feb. 10, 1988).
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On April 6, 1988, President Ronald Reagan made a decision to im-
pose sanctions against Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ment. But he refrained from imposing trade sanctions against Japan
under the Pelly Amendment. As mentioned above, since U.S. allocations
of fish to Japanese fishermen in the U.S. 200-mile waters were zero in this
year, the decision had no significant impact on the Japanese fishing in-
dustry. The aim of the measure taken was to impose political and psycho-
logical pressures on the Japanese to deter them from continuing scientific
permit whaling. The U.S. diplomatic strategy to deal with the whaling
issue attempts to compel the whaling countries to stop commercial whal-
ing by using the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the Pelly Amend-
ment as enforcement leverage. However, such a unilateral use or threat of
sanctions is of dubious legality under international law.
The research whaling dispute is part of a long-pending whaling ques-
tion between both countries and is only the tip of the iceberg. In the
background of this controversy lies a perception gap concerning the whale
and whaling. Owing to differences in dietary customs, religious beliefs,
cultural backgrounds and emotional sensibilities, this perception gap re-
mains wide and appears to be growing.
In the great era of American whaling during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, Americans hunted the whale solely for its oil. The aim
of Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 was generally to force Japan
to open the door to the world, but particularly to re-supply American
whaling vessels. However, the discovery of petroleum in Pennsylvania in
1859 marked a turning point in American whaling. Decreased demand for
whale oil led to the end of the whaling industry. At present, Americans
have no direct economic interests in whaling. For this reason, the United
States has evolved its national position on whales along the lines of a
protectionist approach.
On the other hand, the Japanese have been heavily dependent upon
the whale as a source of food and for other purposes from days immemo-
rial. The fact that many whale bones have been excavated from Japanese
archaeological mounds demonstrates that whale meat and bones were
used by the ancient Japanese. The whale is mentioned in many parts of
the "Manyoshu," the oldest anthology of poems in Japan, which was com-
plied at the end of the eighth century. For the Japanese people, the whale
is not only a food source, but also a basis of culture. All parts of the whale
have been used most effectively, and have become part of the daily life of
the Japanese and contributed to the formation of a unique traditional
culture. To cite one example, baleens of the right whale have been used as
an essential part of "Bunraku," Japan's traditional puppet theater. How-
ever, nowadays, it is difficult to obtain them because the catch of this
species is completely prohibited.
Since the introduction of the idea of a moratorium on commercial
whaling in the international fora by the United States, confrontation be-
tween the whaling countries and the anti-whaling countries, especially be-
tween Japan and the United States, has been generated due to divergent
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views on the moratorium. It culminated in the adoption of the morato-
rium decision at the 34th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) in 1982.
It goes without saying that if the existence of a whale species is truly
endangered, whaling should be stopped. Even before the moratorium de-
cision, pelagic fleet hunting of all the large whales such as the blue, fin,
right, humpback and gray whales had been prohibited. The Scientific
Committee of the IWC has pointed out that while the bowhead whale is
most endangered, the minke whale, which was the only target of commer-
cial whaling in the Antarctic, is far from any possibility of extinction.
Stocks of the minke whale are considered to have increased to sufficient
numbers to enable a non-endangering catch. In the paper presented in
1975 to the Scientific Committee by Dr. K. Radway Allen, an Australian
scientist, it was reported that "the overall estimate for the initial
Antarctic population of exploitable size minke whales appears to be in
about the range of 40-60 thousand."'4 In such a situation, it is rational to
make optimum utilization of these resources.
There is considerable doubt whether the moratorium decision is ra-
tional. While it applies even to the minke whale species which is in no
actual danger of extinction, a truly endangered species, the bowhead
whale, is exempted from its application. Decision-makers in the United
States have instigated the taking of an emotional approach to this deli-
cate and intricate problem instead of increasing the understanding of di-
etary, cultural and ethical differences. In 1972, Dr. Robert M. White, U.S.
Commissioner to the IWC, said that "a critical element in changing the
attitude of the IWC has been the advocacy of strong whale conservation
measures by non-governmental organizations."'
The resignation in 1972 of Dr. J. L. McHugh, who was the predeces-
sor of Dr. White and Chairman of the IWC, symbolized the U.S. policy
change. It was a truly unhappy moment in the history of the IWC. Dr.
McHugh gave the following warning: "There is a danger that overzealous
and uninformed people will continue to promote the notion that whaling
continues unchecked and that a total moratorium is the only answer." He
also stated that:
Most people think that 'whales are an endangered species,' as I read
in an article not too long ago. This view ignores the fact that, of the
approximately 100 different kinds of Cetacea, less than 20 are being
taken commercially, and less than 10 of these have been
overharvested to the point at which they can be considered 'endan-
gered' according to any reasonable interpretation of the meaning of
that term. Overharvesting of no marine resource can be condoned, but
the fact remains that the Whaling Commission has declared a morato-
4. K. Radway Allen, An Assessment of Antarctic Minke Whale Stocks, Int'l Whaling
Comm'n Rep., No. 26 (1976).
5. International Decisions to Decide the Fate of Whales, CONSERVATION NEWS, Vol. 36,
No. 27, 5 (Feb. 1, 1972).
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rium on certain whale species, has set catch limits on other
overharvested stocks which should allow them to increase while still
being taken commercially, and has set limits on the catch of others
which should allow a catch to be taken indefinitely at levels of maxi-
mum sustainable yields. A total moratorium is not only irrational and
unnecessary, but impossible to achieve. Continued pressure for total
cessation of all whaling could well be counterproductive, by destroying
the Commission just when it has finished resolving most of its major
problems. It is to be hoped that reason will prevail, and that all efforts
will be directed toward supporting the International Whaling Com-
mission and strengthening it in every possible way."
The subsequent history of the IWC demonstrates what Dr. McHugh
pointed out. It is particularly unhappy and dangerous that decision-mak-
ers intentionally mislead the general public with fabricated information.
At present, most of the goodwilled people in the world, especially in the
United States, seem to be caught in two kinds of "whale traps" set by
decision-makers and the news media. Mrs. Janice S. Henke, American
cultural anthropologist, speaks of such a "whale trap": "[tihe current
American belief is that all whales are severely endangered, and that even
in the face of this, they are all still being ruthlessly hunted."7
Another recent "whale trap" is the belief that Japan is conducting
commercial operations under the guise of scientific whaling. Mr. Russell
E. Train, who served as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
Stockholm Conference and head of the U.S. delegation to the IWC, re-
cently made a speech at the National Press Club as follows: "Japan is
proceeding with commercial whaling and calling it 'science' ..... Here we
are, 16 years later, at what may be the final, crucial decision point."8
This is a deplorable misunderstanding. His speech reveals that his
real intention lies in stopping commercial whaling by all means. However,
according to the common definition of "commercial", Japan is, in fact,
not currently participating in "commercial" whaling. In 1984, Japan ac-
cepted the moratorium decision on commercial whaling by the IWC
under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure. According to this decision by the
Government of Japan, the last remaining whaling company, Nippon Ky-
odou Hogei Co., was dissolved on November 27, 1987. As a result, Japa-
nese scientific permit whaling is now being conducted by the Institute of
Cetacean Research, which was established on October 30, 1987 and suc-
ceeds the predecessor institute, the Whale Research Institute. The Insti-
tute of Cetacean Research is a non-profit organization. Its aims are to
conduct research and study on various aspects of cetaceans and other
marine mammals. Its research activities, including the research cruises to
6. J. McHUGH, THE ROLE AND HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
334-35 (W. Schevill, ed. 1974).
7. J. S. Henke, The Whale Trap: An American Perspective, AMERICAN SCHOLARS QUES-
TION WHALING BAN, Japan Whaling Association 6 (1987).
8. R. Train, Statement at the National Press Club 2 (Jan. 13, 1988).
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the Antarctic, are carried out under contract with the Japanese Govern-
ment. It can not engage in commercial activities.
Certainly, whales taken under special permits will be processed after
conducting scientific investigations, and whale meat and by-products will
come into the market. However, the sale of the meat and by-products is
not for avaricious business purposes, but for supporting research efforts,
especially for financing the research cruises to the Antarctic. Under con-
tract with the Japanese Government, it is conditioned that any profit re-
sulting from the sale of whale products should revert back to the research
program.
In 1990, the moratorium decision by the IWC is scheduled for review.
Japan is waiting in strong expectation for the findings of the Comprehen-
sive Assessment by the IWC. In order to make contributions to the review
work, the Japanese Government decided to continue the survey of the
resource state of whales, especially of the minke whale, in the Antarctic.
For that purpose, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Japan
presented a research program.9 Under the program, it was planned to
take 1,650 minke whales in the Antarctic during the four years from 1987/
88 to 1990/91. Since the sampling was designed for two years out of the
four year period, the proposed annual sample size was 825 minke whales
and 50 sperm whales. However, in the IWC, the anti-whaling countries
were strongly opposed to the Japanese research program. Upon the pro-
posal of the United Kingdom, the IWC adopted a resolution recom-
mending that Japan refrain from issuing the special permit until the un-
certainties identified are resolved.10 Japan raised legal questions on the
validity of this resolution.
In October 1987, Japan announced that she would proceed that sea-
son with a "Feasibility Study" to see whether the original program would
be viable. A modified plan proposed to reduce the maximum sample size
to 300 minke whales and to exclude the catch of sperm whales." Subse-
quently, Japan continued to make efforts to increase understanding of
the need for scientific whaling. The Japanese Government requested a
Special Meeting of the Scientific Committee to consider the "Feasibility
Study." The Special Meeting was held on December 15-17, 1987 at Cam-
bridge, England, under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. L. Brownell, Jr.
(U.S.A.). However, participating scientists could not reach an agreement
on the problem. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government
decided to send a research cruise to conduct the feasibility study. On De-
cember 23, 1987, a research vessel, Daisan Nishinmaru, departed Japan
9. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
(1987).
10. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 4 (1987).
11. Government of Japan, The Research Plan for the Feasibility Study on 'The Pro-
gram for Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research
on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic'(1987).
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for the Antarctic. In the meantime, upon request of the United Kingdom,
the IWC asked the member countries to vote by post on the Japanese
modified plan. On February 15, the Secretariat of the IWC announced
that the U.K. resolution to ask for cessation of Japanese scientific permit
whaling was adopted by 19 votes in favor, with 6 against and 2
abstentions.
Today, the anti-whaling countries do not seem to be active in collect-
ing data and information necessary for the Comprehensive Assessment.
Rather, they appear to be expecting to maintain uncertainties of the re-
source state in order to continue the moratorium. However, it should be
recalled that the International Decade of Cetacean Research (IDCR) was
initiated by U.S. proposal. In 1975, the IWC adopted a resolution pro-
posed by the U.S. Commissioner recommending that "member nations
give assistance through vessels, personnel or additional funds as contribu-
tions to any part of the IDCR proposals, but particularly, in the areas of
stock monitoring and stock identification in the Southern Hemisphere.""
According to this resolution, the First IDCR started in the 1978/79 sea-
son. In the context of the IDCR minke whale assessment cruises, Japan
provided, without any compensation, ships to be used by scientific teams
from the United States, England, Canada, Australia, the Soviet Union,
South Africa and other countries. From the 1984/85 season, cetacean re-
search projects have moved to the Second IDCR. Japan has spent $15
million on Antarctic minke whale research over the last nine years. This
research is at present the only source of information on the resource state
of whales in that area. In 1987, the Scientific Committee reconfirmed that
there was value in retaining the concept of the IDCR during the period of
the Comprehensive Assessment and that the IDCR would continue after
1990.13
Although the United States was the proponent of the IDCR, it has
made no substantial contribution to it. On the contrary, it has played the
role of an obstructionist. Instead of promoting scientific research activi-
ties, its sole recourse has been the coercive weapon of political and eco-
nomic sanctions. Data and information on the resource state of whales are
essential for rational management. So far the most useful materials for
scientific research on whales have been obtained from commercial opera-
tions. In a paper presented to the IWC, American scientist W. E. Schevill
says as follows:
The cessation of commercial whaling would cut of the supply of much
of the data and we would need to make a major effort to compensate
for this as much as possible. The abundance and distribution of data
could be replaced to some extent by special sightings and collection
cruises, by development of remote sensing techniques and by ad-
vanced marking techniques. Similarly new techniques will enable
some of the biological data to be obtained from free-living animals but
12. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 27th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 13 (1975).
13. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 17 (1987).
VOL. 17:2
THE "WHALE WAR" BETWEEN JAPAN AND U.S.
it will be difficult if not impossible to replace the large statistically
valuable samples available through the commercial fishery. Special
scientific sampling cruises could collect only very much smaller
samples."'
The Scientific Committee of the IWC itself also expressed concern
about the lack of information as a result of the moratorium on commer-
cial whaling. In 1972, it stated as follows: "The absence of commercial
catching operations would make it impossible to obtain certain kinds of
information which are essential for continuing assessment of whale stock.
There is in fact a need for a substantial increase in all kinds of research
activity related to whales."'"
The need for scientific research of whale stocks has also been empha-
sized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO). At the 34th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1982, the following
was pointed out by the FAO observer:
The major issues facing the IWC now concern the continuation of
whaling as an industry. The main threat has come from the industry
itself through the depletion of the stock from excess catches. Here, the
past record of the Commission (IWC) has caused concern such that
none of the baleen whales (other than minke) now support significant
industries. The present record is better. Where commercial whaling is
still being carried on, the catches are, by and large, within the produc-
tive capacity of the stock and should be sustainable indefinitely. How-
ever, this depends on having adequate scientific advice. It is therefore
disturbing that the Commission's Scientific Committee seems to be
finding it increasingly difficult to provide such advice as a result of the
failure of some countries to make all relevant data fully available to
the Committee. If there is a deterioration in the free exchange of data,
the risk of wrong decisions and over-exploitation will obviously in-
crease. It is also disturbing that some analysis of available data, which
have been requested by the Scientific Committee, have not been car-
ried out even when the information is available.'"
In defending Japanese scientific permit whaling, Dr. J. A. Gulland,
Professor of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, in Great
Britain, says as follows: "The Japanese propose to take 1,600 minke
whales in the Antarctic over the next two years. This is a small, but rea-
sonably adequate, sample for providing important scientific information
(e.g., on age composition) that cannot be obtained in any other way. It
represents a harvesting rate of around 0.1 percent per year from a popula-
tion which numbers at least half a million, and probably over one
million."' 7
14. W. E. Schevill and Radway Allen, Expanded Cetacean Research, Int'l Whaling
Comm'n, Rep. no. 24 (1974).
15. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee at 38 (1972).
16. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Annual Mtg./Statement by FAQ Observer (1982).
17. THE TIMES, July 7, 1987, at 17.
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It should be noted that without necessary and adequate data, the
Comprehensive Assessment in 1990 will fail to achieve its objective. Deci-
sion-making of the IWC based on emotional and unscientific grounds will
undermine its credibility.
II. DEVIATION OF THE IWC FROM ITS ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES
The International Convention for the Regulation of whaling (ICRW),
which was signed in Washington on December 2, 1946 and entered into
force on November 10, 1948, established "a system of international regu-
lation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation
and development of whale stocks." Its main objectives are "to provide for
the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the or-
derly development of the whaling industry" (Preamble).
As reflected in the use of the word "whaling", the ICRW is not only
concerned with whale protection, but also represents a compromise
among diverse interests, especially between rational management of
whale resources and economic development by whaling industries. In this
sense, it is based on the concept of ecodevelopment or sustainable
development.
Under the ICRW, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was
created as a single-management authority. It is composed of all member
countries. The IWC has two main subsidiary organs: the Scientific Com-
mittee and the Technical Committee.
The ICRW authorizes the IWC to study whales, whale stocks and
whaling practices (article IV). The IWC is also authorized to amend a
Schedule. The Schedule forms an integral part of the ICRW (article I). It
is a living document, which is changed from time to time in such matters
as annual whaling quotas, the whaling seasons and regulations governing
permissible whaling methods (article V, paragraph 1). A three-quarters
majority vote of member countries is required for amendment of the
Schedule (article III, paragraph 2). Amendments become effective with
respect to the member countries 90 days following notification of the
amendment by the IWC to each member country.
With respect to such amendments, the ICRW provides for an objec-
tion procedure. Under this procedure, any of the member countries may
lodge an objection to a Schedule amendment within 90 days of being noti-
fied of the amendment. If such an objection is filed in a timely manner,
the objecting country is not bound by the amendment (article V, para-
graph 3). In this sense, the right of a member country to present an objec-
tion is absolute and unqualified. This provision was inserted in the ICRW
by a U.S. proposal during its drafting process.
Under the ICRW, the IWC itself has no enforcement powers against
the non-member countries or against the member countries who, by ob-
jecting, choose not to be bound by a given IWC determination. Certainly,
this is a great weakness of the IWC, but it is not unique. No international
fishery organization has power to enforce regulations, and none can make
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regulations contrary to intentions of the member countries.
The history of the IWC, particularly up to the mid-60's, was not nec-
essarily a credit to this organization and its member countries. However,
in 1963, the IWC decided to forbid whaling of the humpback whale, and
in the following year, the catching of the blue whale was prohibited. In
1971, the IWC introduced the International Observer Scheme, under
which all member countries actively whaling undertook to exchange ob-
servers appointed by the IWC. It was in 1972 that the Blue Whale Unit
(BWU)' 8 was abolished and was superseded by separate limits for indi-
vidual species, although it was too late. At the 27th Annual Meeting in
1975, the IWC introduced a new management scheme called the New
Management Procedure (NMP), 9 which is the existing management
system.
Although the accomplishments of the IWC have been substantial in
resource management, they have been exposed to strong criticism by ex-
tremist environmentalists. Events took on an ominous tone in 1972, when
the United States put forward a ten-year moratorium on commercial
whaling at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
held in Stockholm. Since then, IWC's annual meetings have turned into a
forum where two opposing camps confront each other with mutually an-
tagonistic management concepts.
At the instigation of environmental groups, and under the initiative
of the United States, the IWC decided, at the 34th Annual Meeting in
1982, to impose a five-year moratorium on all commercial whaling begin-
ning in 1986. This amendment to the Schedule was adopted by 25 votes
in favor, with seven against and five abstentions.
However, it should be noted that the moratorium decision was
adopted without any recommendation of the Scientific Committee. It is
clearly contrary to the ICRW's provision that amendments of the Sched-
ule "shall be based on scientific findings" (article V, paragraph 2(b)).
Moreover, it can not meet the following requirements in the same
provision:
These amendments of the Schedule (a) shall be such as are necessary
to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to
provide for the conservation,development and optimum utilization of
the whale resources; and (d) shall take into consideration the interests
of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry (article
18. In the ICRW, the following formula was used as a basis for setting catch limits in
the Antarctic: one blue whale equals two fin whales which equals two and a half humpback
whales which equals six sei whales. It encouraged the depletion of larger whales.
19. Under this scheme, all stocks of whales are classified into one of the following three
categories according to the state of resources: 1) An Initial Management Stock; 2) A Sus-
tained Management Stock; 3) A Protection Stock. The three categories are established by
determining how much the present stock level has fallen in comparison with the initial stock
level when whaling was started. Before the adoption of the moratorium decision by the
IWC, whaling was permitted for the former two classifications.
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V, paragraph 2).
The adoption of the moratorium decision marked a major turn-about
in the IWC on the whaling issue, bringing a shift from a conservationist
approach (i.e., wise use of living resources) to a protectionist approach
(i.e., absolute prohibition of the catching). This shift has caused various
serious problems, especially concerning compatibility with the ICRW's
provisions and the validity of the IWC's decisions. At present, overem-
phasis of a protectionist approach prevails in the IWC.
In this context, there are six problems that should be discussed:
1. There is considerable deviation of the IWC's activities from the
original objectives and purposes of the ICRW. The moratorium decision
is not compatible with the requirement of "the orderly development of
the whaling industry." In addition, resolutions for putting restrictions on
scientific permit whaling are incompatible with the provision of article
VIII paragraph 1 of the ICRW.20 From the viewpoint of lex lata, a mem-
ber country has the absolute right to issue a special permit for the re-
search take of whales. This is clear from the expression
"[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention" in article
VIII.
2. The moratorium decision is not based on scientific grounds. Its
decision-making processes reveal that scientific advice was not as influen-
tial as political, economic and emotional motivations. Politics appears to
have played a truly significant role in decision-making of the IWC at the
cost of scientific considerations. There is no international fishery organi-
zation other than the IWC in which so little respect has been paid to the
views of the Scientific Committee. It should be recalled that the Scientific
Committee, which convened on June 19-23, 1972, just after the Stock-
holm Conference, expressed the view that "a blanket moratorium can not
be justified scientifically.""1
3. The underlying premise of the moratorium seems to be that whales
are being threatened with extinction for the sake of the commercial whal-
ing industry. This is an unfortunate misconception. All whale species are
not on the brink of extinction. Some whale species are increasing in num-
bers. This is especially true of the minke whale.
In 1971, the Scientific Committee reported that preliminary esti-
20. Art. VIII, para. 1 of the ICRW is as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Convention, any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific re-
search subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the
Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Conven-
tion. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such authori-
zations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time revoke any
such special permit which it has granted."
21. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 38 (1972).
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mates of population size and maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of minke
whales in the Antarctic were 150,000-200,000 and 5,000, respectively, and
that "the stock is essentially unexploited."22 In the following year, the
IWC established a catch limit of 5,000 minke whales for the Antarctic."
In 1973, the MSY of minke whales was estimated to be 5,000-12,230.
However, the Scientific Committee emphasized the importance of a con-
servative approach. As a result, the IWC adopted a catch quota of 5,000.24
Afterwards, however, it became clear that the past estimates were too
low. For that reason, in 1974, the IWC decided on a catch limit of 7,000
minke whales as a maximum safe quota." In 1979, the Scientific Commit-
tee, stating that "since this stock has been increasing in response to re-
duction of other whale stocks, it does not fit into the Commission's pre-
sent classification scheme," recommended that "catch limits be based on
replacement yield." Along this line of recommendation, the IWC decided
on a total catch limit of 8,102.26
Just before the total ban on commercial whaling, it was only the
minke whale that Japan hunted with pelagic fleets in the Antarctic. The
catch number of the last expedition in the 1986/87 season was only 1,941.
Undoubtedly, catches of this size would have no significant effects on the
stocks. The FAO observer, at the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1983, stated that "the Antarctic stock of minke whale is large and can
sustain some moderate level of catches, perhaps a few thousand annually,
without risk of depletion.""7 Therefore, crying complete cessation of com-
mercial whaling is nothing but an unscientific way of thinking. Ironically,
the Scientific Committee, in 1987, estimated that the population of minke
whales in the Southern Hemisphere was approximately 440,000.28
4. On the other hand, the bowhead whale is regarded as being in the
greatest danger of becoming extinct. In 1979, the Scientific Committee
recommended that "from a biological point of view the only safe course is
for the kill of bowhead whales from the Bering Sea stock to be zero."'2 9
However, the United States claimed that the catch limit in 1980 should
be eighteen landed or twenty-six struck. Surprisingly, majority members
in the IWC accepted the U.S. claim. In 1987, the Scientific Committee
estimated current population size of this species to be only about 7,200.0
Nonetheless, the United States requested an increase in the catch limit to
thirty-two struck for 1987 and thirty-five struck for 1988. The IWC
adopted this proposal. Anti-whaling countries and most environmental
groups have not attempted to question this serious matter.
22. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 23rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1971).
23. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 24th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 15 (1972).
24. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 25th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1973).
25. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 26th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1974).
26. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 11 (1979).
27. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 35th Mtg./Statement by FAO Observer, at 1-2 (1983).
28. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 8, Table 3 (1987).
29. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 12 (1979).
30. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 9 (1987).
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5. The United States has targeted its criticism toward "commercial"
whaling in order to exempt the catch of bowhead whales by the Eskimos.
At the Opening Statement of the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1979, Mr. Richard A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner, emphasized the need to
strike a reasonable and equitable balance between the need to preserve
an endangered species and the need to preserve an endangered culture."
In Japan, there are similar kinds of small-scale subsistence whaling
operations in remote coastal communities such as Arikawa, on the Goto
Islands, Taiji, on the southeast coast, and the village of Ayukawa, on the
northeast coast. At the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1987, Japan
asked the member countries for special consideration of this type of whal-
ing.2 However, reactions of the anti-whaling countries and environmental
groups were not so favorable to the Japanese proposal. The main reason
was that Japanese local whaling was involved in commercialism. However,
the fact is that whale meat and other whale products have been locally
consumed, and those not consumed locally have been sold inland and the
profits have been used to buy other foods and commodities which are not
available locally. The geography prevents these small coastal communities
from growing the rice, fruit and vegetables which are essential for local
consumption. For this reason, whale meat is an important source of
animal protein for local people, and whaling is a basis of local industry.
Whaling in these communities has been deeply related to their traditional
culture.
Japanese small-scale whaling bears some resemblance to whaling by
natives in Alaska, Greenland and the U.S.S.R. For instance, whaling by
the native people of Greenland, essentially a subsistence hunting, also has
a minor commercial element. By the decision of the IWC at its 39th An-
nual Meeting, Greenlandic native people are allowed to catch 110 minke
whales and 10 fin whales.33 Therefore, whether or not local whaling has a
commercial aspect is not a decisive factor for the exceptional allowance of
the take. What is important is how the whaling contributes to the nutri-
tional as well as cultural needs of the local people. In this sense, it is
unreasonable that while claiming the need to preserve an endangered cul-
ture, the United States is not ready to accept the existence of traditional
culture in other countries. The criterion for the catch allowance should be
not whether whaling is commercially operated, but whether the target
species is endangered. The U.S. argument does not stand on rational
grounds.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that so-called "structural violence" of
the majority prevails in the IWC. Respect for minority views is the funda-
mental principle of democracy. However, this principle has been trampled
31. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Annual Mtg./U.S. Opening Statement, at 4 (1979).
32. Japan presented the following papers to the IWC: "Japan's Small-Type Subsistence
Whaling," Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg./25; "History of the Consideration of Aboriginal/
Subsistence Whaling," Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./26.
33. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./ Chairman's Rep., para. 16 (1987).
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down by the majority. This majority is the result of maneuvers of anti-
whaling countries and environmental groups. It has been formed by invit-
ing non-whaling countries such as Monaco, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint
Lucia and Senegal, who have no interest in the whaling industry, to join
the IWC. In most cases, their seats in the IWC are occupied by environ-
mentalists of a different nationality.
The only real aim of the majority countries seems to be the choking
off of any type of commercial whaling. They attempt to achieve this aim
by fair means or foul. That is the reason why they have little interest in
scientific research of whale stocks. Prevailing in the IWC is no longer the
scientific approach, but rather what can only be called "missionary zeal."
Even the exercise of the legitimate right of a member country under the
ICRW to file an objection to an amendment of the Schedule or to conduct
scientific whaling is under political and economic pressure. By the threat
or use of "sanctions," the United States has played a leading role as an
international enforcer in forcing the majority's value system upon the
minority.
III. MORATORIUM ISSUE
A. U.N. Stockholm Conference
At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
which was held in Stockholm on June 5-16, 1972, it was the United States
that took the lead in calling for a ten-year moratorium on commercial
whaling. In putting forward such a proposal, Dr. Robert M. White, Ad-
ministrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, stated as
follows:
World whale stocks must be regarded as the heritage of all mankind,
and not the preserve of any one or several nations .... We feel that
strong action in restoring the world's whale stocks is a matter of great
urgency .... A moratorium would allow time for stocks to start re-
building .... A moratorium would allow time to develop a fund of
knowledge as the basis for effective long-term management .... A
moratorium would allow time to adequately, truly strengthen the IWC
to make it a more effective instrument."' '1
The U.S. proposal was unexpected by the Japanese delegation. In or-
der to avoid world-wide accusation as an environmental destroyer, Japan
sought a compromise and submitted an amendment to the U.S. proposal.
It aimed at limiting the ten year moratorium on commercial whaling to
endangered or depleted whale stocks. 5 In opposing the Japanese amend-
ment, Dr. White said as follows:
A moratorium limited to endangered species would represent no sig-
nificant change from the present status. The only species on which
34. U.S. Press Release, HE/13/72 at 1-2 (June 9, 1972).
35. U.N. Press Release, HE/S/51, at 1 (June 9, 1972).
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there is agreement about endangerment are the five already protected
by the IWC. Consequently, if the recommendation is limited to en-
dangered species, it is meaningless since it is recommending the status
quo. And it is the status quo which has brought these species to their
status of endangerment, and has so depleted the other whale [species].
It is not enough to seek protection for a species only after its numbers
have been so reduced as to threaten its existence ... when a species is
that depleted it no longer represents a resource for human welfare,
nor can it play any role in the marine ecosystem. 36
Being faced with the refusal by the U.S. delegation of the compro-
mise proposal, Japan expressed its objection to placing a total ban on
whaling. Motoo Ogiso, the Japanese representative, said that none of the
three great stocks now being exploited were depleted. He regarded a total
ban on whaling as an "extreme" and "unnecessary" measure, and ap-
pealed to the Conference not to discuss this problem from "the political
and emotional point of view," but from a "factual and practical one." 7
However, at the instigation of the environmentalists, the Conference
was full of overzealousness. In such an atmosphere, the recommendation
for the moratorium was approved by the Second Committee. The morato-
rium included; development and environment and management of natural
resources by a vote of fifty-one in favour to three apposed (Japan, Portu-
gal and South Africa), with twelve abstentions. In the Plenary, the recom-
mendation was adopted by a vote of fifty-three in favour to none against,
with three abstentions (Brazil, Japan and Spain). The adopted recom-
mendation was incorporated as Recommendation 33 into the Action Plan
for the Human Environment. It states:
It is recommended that Governments agree to strengthen the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, to increase international research efforts,
and as a matter of urgency to call for an international agreement,
under the auspices of the International Whaling Commission and in-
volving all Governments concerned, for a ten year moratorium on
commercial whaling. 8
Mr. Russell E. Train, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, called the rec-
ommendation "a great victory for the growing international public con-
cern for protection of the whales," and stated, "I hope that this clear ex-
pression by the Stockholm Conference will have great influence upon the
action taken by the International Whaling Commission when it meets
later this month in London."3
In this recommendation, reference is made only to commercial whal-
ing in order to exclude whaling by Alaskan natives from its application.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the recommendation also refers
36. U.S. Press Release, supra note 34, at 2.
37. U.N. Press Release, supra note 35, at 1.
38. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 12.
39. U.S. Press Release, HE12(72) at 1 (June 9, 1972).
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to the strengthening of the IWC and increasing international research
efforts.
B. 24th Annual Meeting of the IWC
The 24th Annual Meeting of the IWC was held in London on June
26-30, 1972, just after the U.N. Stockholm Conference. With the object of
enabling the IWC to institute a global moratorium on commercial whal-
ing, the U.S. delegation moved and the U.K. delegation seconded a mo-
tion that the Schedule for 1973 be amended in every case where a numer-
ical quota appears to substitute the numeral "0" for all such numerical
quotas.
The proposed moratorium was considered by the Technical Commit-
tee. In introducing it to the Committee, the U.S. delegation explained
that "the state of knowledge of the whale stocks is so inadequate that it is
only common prudence to suspend whaling. This is necessary so that sci-
entific efforts can be redoubled and new research techniques developed."
However, the Committee rejected the motion, four voting in favour and
seven against, three abstained. 0 As mentioned before, the Scientific Com-
mittee was also opposed to the idea of the moratorium and pointed out
that:
A blanket moratorium is in the same category as a blue whale unit
quota, in that they are both attempts to regulate several stocks as one
group whereas prudent management requires regulation of the stocks
individually. Instead of a moratorium, support should be sought for a
decade of intensified research on cetaceans, particularly as regards
problems relevant to their conservation. Such a programme should
proceed in parallel with further development by the Commission of
the policy of bringing catch restrictions into line with the best availa-
ble knowledge of the state of the stocks.4 1
C. 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC
At the 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in London on June 25-
29, 1973, the United States again proposed that commercial whaling for
all species of cetaceans should cease for a period of ten years, except ab-
original catches that do not endanger a species. That proposal was consid-
ered by the Scientific Committee and the Technical Committee. The Sci-
entific Committee expressed the view that at the present time there was
no biological requirement for the imposition of a blanket moratorium on
all commercial whaling.42 However, the Technical Committee, by a major-
ity vote, adopted a resolution proposing a cessation of commercial whal-
ing for ten years.
In the Plenary, the Soviet Union expressed its opposition to the reso-
40. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 24th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1972).
41. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 38 (1972).
42. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 25th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1973).
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lution on the grounds that it was contrary to the findings of the Scientific
Committee, that it was incompatible with the ICRW and would lead to
the cessation of the ICRW and to unregulated whaling. Japan shared that
view and said that the moratorium was in contradiction to the spirit of
the ICRW.43 The vote, 8 in favour, 5 against and 1 abstained, failed to
obtain the necessary three-quarters majority.
D. 26th Annual Meeting of the IWC
Further consideration of a proposed moratorium on commercial
whaling for a ten-year period was given at the 26th Annual Meeting, held
in London, from June 24-28, 1974. The moratorium resolution was ap-
proved by the Technical Committee, but failed to obtain a sufficient ma-
jority in the Plenary. The Scientific Committee maintained the same po-
sition as ever. They pointed out that because of possible competition
between species, rebuilding of severely depleted stocks may not necessa-
rily be maximized by a moratorium.4 4
As already mentioned, in this meeting, the IWC decided to adopt the
New Management Procedure (NMP) which was designed to classify the
whale stocks into three categories and to provide for their individual
management. It was the aim of the NMP to set catch limits so that such
stocks would rebuild towards the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
level. This was a compromise between the IWC member countries still
whaling commercially, and those wanting a moratorium. In the adoption
of the NMP, the United States Commissioner stated that his Government
still supported a ten-year moratorium but had voted for the resolution
because it felt it represented a significant step forward in the manage-
ment of the world's whales.4 5
E. 27th Annual Meeting of the IWC
At its 27th Annual Meeting, held in London from June 23-27, 1975,
the IWC made a formal decision that all stocks of whales should be classi-
fied according to the advice of the Scientific Committee into one of the
following three categories: (i) Initial Management Stocks; (ii) Sustained
Management Stocks; (iii) Protection Stocks. It was agreed that commer-
cial whaling should be permitted on Initial Management Stocks and Sus-
tained Management Stocks subject to the advice of the Scientific Com-
mittee and that there shall be no commercial whaling on species or stocks
classified as Protection Stocks.
At the opening statement of the 28th Annual Meeting of the IWC,
the Chairman, Mr. A. G. Bollen (Australia) said that the adoption of the
43. Id. at para. 9.
44. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and Recom-
mendations to the Commission, para. 2 (1974).
45. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 26th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1974).
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NMP was the most critical decision in the Commission's history."6
F. 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC
In spite of the IWC's introduction of a severe resource management
system under the NMP, the United States was not satisfied. On June 1,
1979, one month before the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC, President
Carter stated as follows:
I believe that there is strong international support for efforts to pre-
serve the world's whales. To reflect that support, the United States at
this meeting will propose that all nations stop commercial whaling
now, until there is an effective, comprehensive conservation program
for whales which will guarantee their continued survival."7
At the Meeting, held in London from July 9-13, 1979, Mr. Richard A.
Frank, U.S. Commissioner, reintroduced a proposal for an indefinite mor-
atorium on commercial whaling and explained as follows:
Since 1975, when the New Management Procedure was adoptedwith
the support of the United States, we have not pressed the moratorium
issue in this forum. However, it has become increasingly clear that our
management system is not functioning as adequately as we believe
necessary. The time has thus come for a change."8
In justification of the proposed moratorium, Mr. Frank criticized the
NMP by saying that the most serious deficiencies in the current system
are a follows: 1. Exports of assistance to and imports of whale meat from
non-members have seriously undermined the NMP. 2. The NMP is not
fully capable of taking into account serious whale population declines. 3.
Member nations have failed to submit sufficient data. 4. Member nations
have failed to fund the IWC adequately. Therefore, "the Commission
should adopt a moratorium until responsible management is possible."49
In opposing the proposed moratorium, the Japanese Commissioner
stated as follows:
The Japanese Delegation would like to remind all the participants
here that the Scientific Committee does not support the moratorium
on whaling and Japan agrees with this view. Proposals for a morato-
rium, in the opinion of the Japanese Delegation, seem to be inappro-
priate for the following reasons:
(1) Each and every whale stock is carefully monitored and managed
by the IWC. Only those stocks deemed to be very healthy can be ex-
ploited, and then only with a good margin of safeguard. There is no
reason why the IWC should apply a moratorium on all whaling when
there is no scientific need to do so;
46. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 4 (1976).
47. Statement of the White House, at 2 (June 1979).
48. Opening Statement of R. A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner at 2 (July 9, 1979).
49. Statement of R. A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner, on the Proposal for an Indefinite
Moratorium on Commercial Whaling, at 7 and 15 (July, 1979).
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(2) One of the objectives of the Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling is to "provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling indus-
try." Proposals for a moratorium, in the view of the Japanese Delega-
tion, do not meet this objective;
(3) A moratorium on whaling would make it practically impossible to
collect data on whale stocks;
(4) Japan does not agree with the idea of separating commercial whal-
ing from subsistence whaling. In its view, both kinds of whaling are
essentially the same in terms of utilization of whales for the benefit of
mankind; and
(5) Moratorium proposals, if passed, will discourage non-member
whaling countries from becoming members of the Commission and
may lead to withdrawals of certain member countries, which would be
the end of the IWC regime.' 0
During the Meeting, the Technical Committee, by a majority deci-
sion, adopted a recommendation to stop whaling until there is a conserva-
tion proposal in effect which would ensure the survival of whales. How-
ever, no consensus was reached in the Plenary."
G. 32nd Annual Meeting of the IWC
The 32nd Annual Meeting of the IWC was held in Brighton July 21-
25, 1980. In the opening statement, the U.S. Commissioner said that "the
United States is again proposing a moratorium on commercial whaling to
protect whales until the inadequacies of the existing conservation pro-
gram have been corrected."52
In criticizing the idea of the moratorium, Dr. I. V. Nikonozov,
U.S.S.R. Commissioner, said that "we are becoming increasingly aware of
our responsibility and obligations to mankind for the conservation of
whale stocks, which, however, does not exclude reasonable harvesting of
whales from stocks whose state permits it to do so."'" The Japanese Com-
missioner stated as follows:
Any proposal for a total ban or moratorium would obviously be a con-
travention of the provisions of the Convention particularly article V -
unless it were supported by solid scientific proof that a temporary or
permanent ban on whaling at this point was the only recourse left in
maintaining each and every stock of whales within a safety range, and
that even a small catch would do irreversible damage to each and
every such stock and lead to their extinction."
Mr. M. C. Mercer, Canadian Commissioner, also opposed the pro-
50. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Opening Statement of Japan, at 1-2 (1979).
51. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 6 (1979).
52. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg./Opening Statement, U.S.A. at 1-2 (1980).
53. Opening Statement by Dr. I. V. Nikonozov, U.S.S.R. Commissioner, at 1 (July
1980).
54. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg./Opening Statement, Japan at 1 (1980).
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posed moratorium and said:
It is our view that, in the absence of a clear and scientifically justified
recommendation from the Scientific Committee in support of a mora-
torium on commercial whaling, such action is unnecessary and that
conservation requirements can be adequately met under the "New
Management Procedure" of stock classification and quotas, which in
essence provides for selective moratoria (zero quotas) based on scien-
tific analyses of stock status. It is our view that a moratorium on all
commercial whaling, not based on scientific grounds, is inconsistent
with the expressed purposes and with article V of the present
Convention. 5
During the course of the Meeting, there was extensive discussion on
the proposed moratorium. However, the proposal failed to obtain the nec-
essary three-quarters majority (thirteen in favour, nine against and two
abstained).
H. 33rd Annual Meeting of the IWC
At the 33rd Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in Brighton from July
20-25, 1981, the Technical Committee by a majority vote recommended
an amendment to the Schedule which would have the effect of placing a
moratorium on all commercial whaling. However, in the Plenary the pro-
posal failed to reach the three-quarters majority necessary to amend the
Schedule (sixteen in favor, eight against and three abstained).56
I. 34th Annual Meeting of the IWC
The 34th Annual Meeting of the IWC took place in Brighton from
July 19-24, 1982. During the Meeting, five proposals from the Seychelles,
U.K., U.S.A., France and Australia, seeking an end to commercial whal-
ing, were presented. Upon the Seychelles' proposal, the IWC decided to
amend the Schedule by twenty-five votes in favor, with seven against and
five abstentions, so that the following new paragraph is added to para-
graph 10:
Notwithstanding the other provision of paragraph 10, catch limit for
the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the
1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be
zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best
scientific advice, and by 1990 the Commission will undertake a com-
prehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks
and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of
other catch limits.8 7
It should be noted that the decision is not an indefinite moratorium
55. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg./Canadian Statement on the Moratorium on all
Commercial Whaling, at 1 (1980).
56. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 33rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 7 (1981).
57. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 6 (1982).
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and provides for its automatic reconsideration in 1990.
IV. SCIENTIFIC WHALING ISSUE
A. Problem of Guidelines
According to the moratorium decision of the IWC, commercial whal-
ing can not be undertaken by the member countries after 1986 unless an
objection to the decision is lodged by a country. Nevertheless, the mem-
ber countries are guaranteed the right to issue a special permit for re-
search whaling under article VIII, paragraph 1 of the ICRW. By invoking
this provision, the whaling countries have tried to show the abundance of
the resource state, and in particular to provide data and information for
the Comprehensive Assessment of the moratorium decision. On the other
hand, the anti-whaling countries have attempted to put restrictions on
the freedom of scientific permit whaling on the ground of the possibility
of its abuse.
At the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1979, the Technical Com-
mittee, by a majority decision, adopted the recommendation concerning
the addition of the following paragraph to the Schedule:
A Contracting Government shall provide the Secretariat with pro-
posed scientific permits before they are issued and in sufficient time
to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them.
The proposed permits should specify: (a) objectives of the research;
(b) number, sex, size and stock of the animals to be taken; (c) oppor-
tunities for participation in the research by scientists of other nations;
and (d) possible effect on conservation of the stock. Proposed permits
shall be reviewed and commented on by the Scientific Committee at
Annual Meetings when possible. When permits would be granted
prior to the next Annual Meeting, the Secretary shall send the pro-
posed permits to members ofthe Scientific Committee by mail for
their comment and review. Preliminary results of any research result-
ing from the permits should be made available at the next Annual
Meeting of the Scientific Committee."S
This amendment is of dubious legality because of possible conflicts
with article VIII of the ICRW and the sovereign rights of states. No refer-
ence is made to prior review of scientific permits in article VIII.19 The
IWC decided to amend the Schedule by 13 votes in favour to 4 against,
with 6 abstentions.
In order to facilitate the review of scientific permits, the Scientific
Committee developed a series of Guidelines for review in 1985. They are:
Guideline 1, information required; Guideline 2, objectives of research;
Guideline 3, review of Information on status of stocks; Guideline 4, com-
ments on methodology; Guideline 5, participation by scientists from other
58. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 7 (1979).
59. Under Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the ICRW, the member countries issuing special
permits are only required to report to the IWC.
VOL. 17:2
THE "WHALE WAR" BETWEEN JAPAN AND U.S.
nations, and Guideline 6, possible effect on conservation of the stock. In
view of these Guidelines, some members of the Committee suggested that
Governments of Iceland and Korea refrain from issuing permits.60
In the same year, the IWC adopted the "Resolution on Scientific Per-
mits" in which it was recommended that any whaling under special per-
mits be conducted strictly in accordance with scientific requirements, and
to take account of the advice and guidelines of the Scientific Committee.
The Resolution also referred to the setting up of a Working Group to
study a draft resolution proposed by Sweden and seconded by Switzer-
land on the subject of scientific permits and any relevant matters."
In 1986, the Working Group met to discuss the draft resolution, but
consensus was not reached, particularly because of the divergent opinions
concerning a paragraph recommending that the products from special
permit catches should not enter international trade. In order to bring the
deadlock to an end, Argentina suggested the establishment of a small
Working Group. After further protracted discussion in the Group, a new
formula was developed and presented to the Chairman. Upon this propo-
sal, the IWC adopted by consensus the following Resolution:
When reviewing such permits and when reviewing the results of re-
search from permits previously issued in accordance with the proce-
dures of the Convention, the Scientific Committee should take into
account whether:
(1) the objectives of the research are not practically and scientifically
feasible through non-lethal research techniques;
(2) the proposed research is intended, and structured accordingly to
contribute information essential for rational management of the stock;
(3) the number, age and sex of whales to be taken are necessary to
complete the research and will facilitate the conduct of the compre-
hensive assessment; and
(4) whales will be killed in a manner consistent with the provisions of
Section III of the Schedule, due regard being had to whether there are
compelling scientific reasons to the contrary.2
In that Resolution it is also recommended that following the comple-
tion of scientific treatment, the meat as well as the other products should
be utilized primarily for local consumption. It should be particularly
noted that in the Resolution the link is made between scientific permits
and the Comprehensive Assessment.
At the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in Bournemouth from
June 22-26, 1987, the United States proposed a resolution, cosponsored
by Australia, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden. It was in-
tended to give the IWC the discretion to recommend to the member
countries whether the proposed research was consistent with the IWC's
60. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 5 (1985).
61. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 2 (1985).
62. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 2 (1986).
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conservation policy. For that purpose it was suggested that the following
four criteria should be added to the Scientific Committee's guidelines:
(1) The research addresses a question or questions that should be an-
swered in order to conduct the comprehensive assessment or to meet
other critically important research needs;
(2) The research can be conducted without adversely affecting the
overall status and trends of the stock in question or the success of the
comprehensive assessment of such stock;
(3) The research addresses a question or questions that cannot be an-
swered by analyses of existing data and/or use of non-lethal research
techniques; and,
(4) The research is likely to yield results leading to reliable answers to
the question or questions being addressed.13
Japan was dismayed at the reopening of the permit issue dealt with
in the preceding year and said that the Resolution infringed upon the
sovereign rights of Contracting Governments to issue special permits. Ice-
land stated that since the Resolution was inconsistent with the ICRW, it
would not consider itself bound by such a Resolution and would seek re-
medial methods in accordance with international law. The Soviet Union
pointed out that the Resolution was in contradiction to the provisions of
article VIII of the ICRW.
As a justification of the Resolution, the United States invoked article
VI of the ICRW.6 5 However, it is doubtless that in article VIII the appli-
cation of article VI is excluded by the phrase "Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Convention." It goes without saying that the expression
"anything contained in the Convention" includes not only article VI, but
also other articles of the ICRW and its Schedule. Thus, U.S. reliance on
article VI cannot be justified. In spite of an unequivocal meaning of the
phrase of article VIII, the Resolution was adopted by 19 votes for, 6
against with 7 abstentions." The lack of legal validity of the Resolution is
beyond doubt."'
B. Problem of Japanese Permits
As mentioned earlier, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1987, Japan submitted a research program. It was explained that the
principal aim of the program was to obtain estimates of various biological
63. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./24.
64. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 8 (1987).
65. Article VI of the ICRW provides as follows: "The Commission may from time to
time make recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which
relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention."
66. See supra note 64, appendix 1.
67. During the Meeting, Iceland presented a paper concerning the "legal analysis" of
the Resolution. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg. at 2. In that paper, it is concluded that
"the adoption and implementation of the proposed resolution, having no authority in the
Convention and being inconsistent with express provisions thereof, would be ultra vires,
void ab initio and ipso facto and without any legal effect whatever."
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parameters, especially of age-specific natural mortality. Additionally, it
was also intended to elucidate the role of whales, (namely, the sperm
whale and the minke whale) as a key species in the Antarctic marine
ecosystem. Japan emphasized that the results to be obtained by the im-
plementation for this program will provide a scientific basis for resolving
problems facing the IWC which have generated confrontation among the
member nations due to the divergent views on the moratorium.
Unlike the past research activities, the research program would be
under the control of a standing committee called the "Whale Research
Coordinating Committee" which would consist of the Institute of Ceta-
cean Research, the Far Seas Fisheries Research Laboratory, the Fisheries
Agency and other relevant institutions. Actual research activities such as
sampling research would be conducted by the Institute of Cetacean Re-
search. Therefore, the special permit by the Government of Japan under
article VIII of the ICRW is issued to the Institute.
It was also suggested that opportunities for participation in the re-
search cruises under the program would be given to foreign scientists and
that data and materials would be placed under the supervision of the
IWC allowing free access to the scientific activities by the IWC. In the
opening address of this Meeting, however, John Selwyn Gummer, Minis-
ter of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food of the United
Kingdom, implicitly criticized the Japanese research program as follows:
It would be a tragedy if, under the guise of scientific study or subsis-
tence hunting, commercial whaling were reintroduced. It will be nec-
essary to allow the taking of whales for scientific purposes, and aborig-
inal effort will remain. Yet if either exception is used as a cover for
continued commercial exploitation, the credibility of the IWC will be
undermined. The world will not forgive us if promises to protect the
whale are betrayed by subterfuge."'
Two views were expressed in the Scientific Committee with respect
to the Japanese research program. One view was that the proposed
catches would have no significant effects on the stocks. Another was that
past catches had probably already had a substantial effect on the stock in
the proposed research area and that the proposed catches would have the
possible adverse effects on this stock.
The Committee members who took the latter view emphasized that
non-lethal methods were available for the estimation of recruitment and
the study of stock identity. Members who held the former position, how-
ever, pointed out that the specific objectives, which were concerned with
the analysis of material (particularly ear plugs, ovaries, and stomach con-
68. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem to the Antarctic, at 2,
19, 20 and 22 (1987).
69. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., Speech of Welcome by Minister of State, Minis-
try of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, U.K. (1987).
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tents collected from dead whales) could not be carried out through non-
lethal research. They also added that non-lethal methods, such as photo-
identification, would be difficult to apply to Southern Hemisphere minke
whales. These whales have quick mobile behaviour and a large stock size
and it is not known whether they have identifiable individual
characteristics.
70
In view of the difference of opinions in the Scientific Committee, the
UK submitted to the Plenary a "Proposed Resolution on Japanese Propo-
sal for Special Permits."71 It recommended that the Government of Japan
"refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals . .. until such time
as the Scientific Committee is able to resolve the serious uncertainties
identified in its discussion." In explaining the proposed Resolution, the
UK said that with respect to minke whales "it had not been satisfactorily
demonstrated that this large undertaking would produce reliable results,"
and that "sperm whale work was not of essential importance to the com-
mission at this time. 72
In replying to this criticism, Japan pointed out the "the only way to
reduce uncertainty in knowledge of the stocks is by carrying out re-
search." It was also emphasized that "the program has been designed
with a genuine scientific aim .... a new research institute has been estab-
lished to implement this long term stock .... The sample sizes are large
enough to give reliable results but will not adversely affect the stocks."73
Japan then presented an amendment to the UK proposal, deferring
consideration and any action until the 40th Annual Meeting.7 However,
the Japanese amendment was defeated by 11 votes for and 16 against,
with 4 abstentions. As a consequence, the IWC by the necessary majority
adopted the Resolution which recommends to the Government of Japan
not to carry out the proposed research program.75
V. POLICYMAKING PROCESSES OF THE U.S.A. AND JAPAN
A. U.S.A.
Eskimos and Indians have a long history of whaling in America. E. J.
Slijper says that "the Indians of the west coast of North America proba-
bly began as early as the 16th century to hunt the California Grey Whale,
a mammal which is found exclusively in the northern part of the Pacific
Ocean."' '
It was in the middle of the 17th century that the whalers of New
70. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 11.3(a)(6) (1987).
71. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., para. 45 (1987).
72. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 8.2(c) (1987).
73. Id. para. 8.2(c).
74. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 47.
75. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 4 (1987).
76. E. J. Slijper, A Hundred Years of Modern Whaling, Netherlands Commission for
International Nature Protection, 30 (1965).
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England started to hunt sperm whales. The hunt of this species was prac-
ticed very intensively in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans until
about the middle of the 19th century.
The discovery and increasing utilization of petroleum in America,
however, led to decreased demand for whale oil and to the decline of
whaling. J. L. McHugh explains that "the great era of American Whaling
ended before 1900. The collapse came not from a scarcity of whales but
from the discovery of petroleum in 1859 and the destruction of much of
the American whaling fleet during the Civil War.""' E. J. Slijper also says:
The rise of the cotton industry in America and the gold rush together
with the fact that petroleum was first discovered in 1859, had such an
effect on sperm whaling that by 1860 the industry of those days had
practically come to an end, even though the last sperm whalers did
not return until 1925 for the last time to the harbour of New
Bedford."8
In fact, it was early in 1971 that the Del Monte Fishing company, last
survivors of a vast and historic industry which once sent 750 New Eng-
land ships to sea, finished its final expedition with a catch of nearly 100
whales. The Company's license for hunting was not renewed for 1972 as a
result of the adoption of the new U.S. whaling policy. 7
In 1969, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Conservation Act.
Under this Act, the Secretary of the Interior was asked to put certain
species of whales on the Endangered Species list. On December 2, 1970,
the Department of the Interior placed eight species of whales (the bow-
head, right, grey, blue, humpback, fin, sei and sperm) on the endangered
list. On December 12, 1971, Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior,
said: "We have done everything we can unilaterally, and we must now
consider our efforts on getting the IWC to enforce their own regulations
and to set realistic catch quotas by individual species and area in order to
allow a maximum rebuilding of all whale populations."' 0
It should be noted that reference was not made to a total ban on
whaling but to setting "realistic catch quotas by individual species and
area." At the 23rd Annual Meeting of the IWC held in Washington from
June 21-25, 1971, U. Alexis Johnson, under Secretary of State for Politi-
cal Affairs, stated that "the blue whale unit must be abolished as a regu-
latory device and quotas must be established by species and by stock and
more stringet criteria should be used in setting quotas.""1
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international conservation
programs, Congress enacted in 1971 the so-called Pelly Amendment to
the Fishermen's Protective Act. Section 8(a) of the amendment reads as
77. J. L. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 321.
78. See supra note 76.
79. CONSERVATION NEWS, supra note 5, at 1.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 23rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 3 (1971).
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follows:
(1) When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a
foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing opera-
tions in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effec-
tiveness of an international fishery conservation program, the Secre-
tary of Commerce shall certify such fact to the President.
(2) When the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior
finds that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are en-
gaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any
international program for endangered or threatened species, the Sec-
retary making such finding shall certify such fact to the President.
(3) Upon receipt of any certification made under paragraph (1) or (2),
the President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the
bringing or the importation into the United States of fish products if
the certification is made under paragraph (1) or wildlife products (if
the certification is made under paragraph (2)) from the offending
country for such duration as the President is sanctioned by the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.82
As illustrated above, until 1971, the U.S. Government undertook a
series of conservation measures on whale species at the domestic level. At
the international level, the United States intended to strengthen the
IWC's regulations on a species by species approach. However, in 1972
when the U.N. Stockholm Conference was held, the U.S. whaling policy
underwent a significant change. Prior to the Conference, both Houses of
Congress approved a resolution calling for a ten-year moratorium on
whaling. The Department of the Interior was extremely active in promot-
ing the new policy. However, the Department of State opposed the policy
because of diplomatic consideration between Japan and the U.S.S.R.
Such a prudent posture of the Department of State was exposed to a
storm of criticism by environmental groups. The Department of State was
finally faced with the decision of taking the initiative in the Conference
for a total ban on commercial whaling. Thus, the legislative and executive
branches of the United States government stood on the same footing.
After the Conference, on October 26, 1972, Congress enacted the
Marine Mammal Protection Act."3 It stipulated that, except in cases au-
thorized by the Secretary of Commerce, "there shall be a moratorium on
the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal
products." 84 Referring to the international program, it directs the Secre-
tary of Commerce, through the Secretary of State, to "initiate the amend-
ment of any existing international treaty for the protection and conserva-
82. Paragraph (2) of this provision was added in 1978 in response to the signing by the
United States of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora. According to this addition, necessary adjustments were made in paragraph
(3).
83. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(1972)(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1361 (1982)).
84. Id. at 86 Stat. 1029 (sec.101 (a)).
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tion of any species of marine mammal to which the United States is a
party in order to make such treaty consistent with the purposes and poli-
cies of this Act."8
Subsequently, on December 28, 1973, the Endangered Species Act
was enacted by Congress.86 It provides that "the Secretary of the Interior
shall publish in the Federal Register, and from time to time he may by
regulation revise, a list of all species determined by him or the Secretary
of Commerce to be endangered species and a list of all species determined
by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be threatened species. "87 The
same eight whale species as in 1970 were placed on the list made up by
the Department of the Interior in 1984.8 Therefore, the Department has
never considered the minke whale to be an endangered species.
It is noteworthy that Alaskan natives are exempted from the applica-
tion of this Act. The Act stipulates as follows: "The provisions of this Act
shall not apply with respect to the taking of any endangered species or
threatened species, or the importation of any such species taken pursuant
to this section, by; (a) any Indian, Aleut or Eskimo who is an Alaskan
native who resides in Alaska; or (b) any non-native permanent resident or
an Alaskan native village if such taking is primarily for subsistence pur-
poses."8 9 It is clear that this exception is based upon political considera-
tions which override conservation needs.
As mentioned earlier, in 1972, the United States presented to the
IWC the proposal of a global moratorium on commercial whaling under
the strong backing of environmental groups. Prior to the 28th Annual
Meeting of the IWC, which was held in London from June 24-28, 1974,
chief representatives of the seventeen largest environmental groups in
America, including the National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, Na-
tional Audubon society, Fund for Animals, Animal Welfare Institute, the
Wilderness Society and others, had a joint press conference to protest the
whaling polices of Japan and the U.S.S.R. After the meeting, the environ-
mental group representatives called on the embassies of the two countries
to "reevaluate your previous objections" to the ten-year moratorium on
commercial whaling. Charging Japan and the U.S.S.R with having
"blocked all progress toward implementing the will of the other IWC
member nations" and "refusing to abide by even modest conservation
measures," they said that "drastic economic pressure is our only re-
source," and that "should your governments continue to obstruct the ef-
forts to guarantee the protection of whales, we will have little choice but
85. Id. at 86 Stat. 1039 (sec. 108(a)(4)).
86. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973)(codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1531 (1982)).
87. Id. at 87 Stat. 887 (sec. 4(c)).
88. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants 8 (July 20, 1984).
89. Endangered Species Act, supra note 86, at (sec. 10(e)).
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to continue and expand economic pressure."9
At the diplomatic level, the U.S. Government has tried to persuade
the whaling countries, especially Japan and the U.S.S.R., to cease whaling
and has used the Pelly Amendment as leverage to extract their conces-
sions. In view of the difficulty of compelling them to stop whaling under
the Pelly Amendment, a general outcry arose for stronger enforcement
leverage. In 1979, Congress determined that the Pelly Amendment, how-
ever effective, was inadequate to the task of persuading the whaling coun-
tries to give up whaling. For that reason, Congress passed the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act.
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is directed specifically to
whaling. It provides for an automatic sanction, that is, the reduction of at
least fifty percent of a country's allocation of fish that it can harvest in
the U.S. fishery conservation zone, if the Secretary of Commerce certifies
that nationals of that country are whaling in a way that "diminishes the
effectiveness" of the ICRW. If the certification by the Secretary of Com-
merce is terminated within one year, the suspended allocation may be
reinstated. If the certification is not terminated within one year, the sus-
pended allocation is permanently rescinded and the Secretary of State
"may not thereafter make any allocation to that country . . . until the
certification is terminated."
To sum up, the following characteristics might be pointed out in the
U.S. decision-making process on whaling problems:
(1) The United States has evolved its national position on whaling
issues in response to general sentiment of the public who believe with
goodwill that all whales are on the brink of extinction. In contrast to
many other issues, both the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment have worked together in meeting the general outcry.
(2) Instead of showing the public the scientific data and information
on the resource state of whale species and removing the common misun-
derstanding that all whale species are severely endangered, the U.S. gov-
ernment has taken advantage of the whaling issues as a political means of
stirring up mistrust of Japan. It is a conventional way in politics for deci-
sion-makers to manipulate diplomatic issues to divert national attention
from their dissatisfaction with domestic issues.
(3) In pursuing the anti-whaling policy, the U.S. government has at-
tempted to mobilize international public opinion through news media and
NGOs' networks. For that purpose, at the 26th Annual Meeting of the
IWC in 1974, the U.S. delegation asked the IWC to consider the proposal
that the press and observers should be admitted to Commission meet-
ings. " Upon this request, at the 30th Annual Meeting in 1978, the IWC
90. Whale Progress Made - Japan Boycott Strengthened, CONSERVATION NEWS, Vol. 39
at 2-3 (Aug. 1974).
91. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 26th Mtg., Circular Letter of the Agenda for the 26th An-
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decided that at the 31st Annual Meeting all Plenary sessions might be
open to the press and that observers might attend meetings of the Com-
mission and the Technical committee.2
(4) Another U.S. strategy for strengthening its influence in the IWC
was to increase the number of the anti-whaling member countries. At the
27th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1975, the U.S. Commissioner stressed
the importance of pursuading non-whaling non-member countries to join
the IWC and suggested that the subject should be placed on the agenda
for the next meeting. 3 In accordance with this strategy, from that year to
1982, the U.S. Government made diplomatic efforts to invite non-whaling
countries to join the IWC in order to obtain the necessary three-quarters
majority for the moratorium decision.
(5) At the 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1973, the U.S. delega-
tion submitted a Draft Protocol concerning amendments to the ICRW.9 4
Upon this suggestion, the IWC adopted in 1974 a Resolution recom-
mending the establishment of a working group to consider the matter. In
that Resolution, the rationale for amendments of the ICRW was that
since the signature of the ICRW in 1946, changes have occurred in whal-
ing and stocks of cetaceans such that there is need to strengthen the
mechanism for the international conservation of whales and their rational
management both at present and in the future, and that the discussions
in the Law of the Sea Conference may affect the activities of the IWC.9 5
Yet, after the adoption of the moratorium decision by the IWC, the U.S.
Government has kept silent on this matter.
(6) The U.S. Government draws a distinction between "commercial"
whaling and "aboriginal" whaling. By this distinction, the catch of bow-
head whales by U.S. aboriginals is exempted from the application of the
moratorium decision. In view of the fact that this species is facing the
greatest danger of extinction, however, the U.S. posture appears to be
inconsistent with a genuine concern for conservation. There is serious
doubt whether U.S. motivations are really directed at conservation
concerns.
(7) The U.S. decisions have been motivated by political considera-
tions rather than by scientifically based arguments. The IWC has adopted
a number of appropriate conservation measures and its stance on the util-
ization of whale resources has been very strict under the NMP. There is
considerable doubt as to the scientific validity of a total ban on commer-
nual Meeting (April 24, 1974).
92. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 30th Annual Meeting, para.
6, and Appendices 1 and 2 (1978).
93. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 27th Annual Meeting, para.
22 (1975).
94. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 25th Annual Meeting, para.
19 (1973).
95. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 26th Annual Meeting, para.
21 (1974).
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cial whaling. Conservation needs vary significantly from species to species
and from stock to stock. In 1972, the Scientific Committee pointed out as
follows: "A blanket moratorium on whaling cannot be justified scientifi-
cally. Prudent management requires regulation of the stocks individually.
A moratorium would also probably bring about a reduction in the amount
of research, whereas there is a prime need for a substantial increase in
research activity."" In 1973, the Committee also emphasized:
The individual whale species are to be regarded by the Commission as
resources which should be managed so as to keep them in a condition
which will enable them to provide the optimum yield on a continuing
basis.... Effective management can only be achieved if each species,
and, indeed, each individual stock is managed and exploited sepa-
rately in the way appropriate to its condition. Any blanket manage-
ment, such as a global moratorium would be in direct contradiction to
this principle.9 7
Despite the fact that the concept of individual species management
has been operating effectively, the introduction of the idea of a global
moratorium on commercial whaling has brought about unecessary confu-
sion in the IWC.
(8) In attempting to force complete cessation of commercial whaling,
the U.S. Government has acted on grounds which are scientificly uncer-
tain and lacking in data on the resource state of whales. It was on the
motion of the U.S. delegation that, in 1972, the IWC adopted a Recom-
mendation on the need of the IDCR. In 1975, the IWC decided, upon the
U.S. proposal, formally to initiate the IDCR. The decision was made "re-
membering that the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stock-
holm, 1972, pointed out the necessity of increased whale research."" In
accordance with this decision, Japan has provided vessels, personnel and
money for the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale Assessment Cruises
which have formed an important part of the IDCR program. If the United
States has doubts about the results that have been obtained by such
cruises, it should suggest an alternative plan for cetacean research in the
Antarctic. Thus far, no constructive attitude has been seen in the U.S.
policy on this matter. Obstruction to the advancement of scientific re-
search of whale resources in the Antarctic seems to be the only policy
choice of the United States.
(9) There is sufficient scientific evidence that the Southern Hemi-
sphere minke whale is in a healthy state and that its stock size can sus-
tain some moderate level of catches without risk of depletion. In 1973, the
Scientific Committee pointed out that "this stock certainly has a surplus
96. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and
Recommendations to the Commission, para. 22 (1972).
97. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and
Recommendations to the Commission, para. 37 (1973).
98. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Chairman's Report of the 27th Annual Meeting (Summary
and Recommendations to the Commission at para. 13 (1975)).
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above the MSY level." 9 Since then, there has been no evidence of any
stock decline; on the contrary, there have been a number of indications of
the stock's increasing. Under these circumstances, the United States can-
not justify sanctions in the name of conserving minke whales. Still more
inappropriate is the imposition of those sanctions upon Japanese scien-
tific catches.
(10) As a diplomatic means for pursuing its whaling policy, the
United States has exerted political and economic pressures on the whal-
ing countries to stop whaling. The U.S. argument on the issue of scientific
whaling is that the research program of the Japanese Government on
minke whales is diminishing the effectiveness of the ICRW. The United
States appears to have undertaken a policeman's role in the international
community regarding whale conservation, despite not having been con-
ferred such an authority.
(11) It seems that the strongest anti-whaling sentiments are founded
on emotions rather than on science and logic. It is folly to force one's own
value system upon other peoples. Food supply sources of each nation are
rooted in long-term tradition and dietary customs. If the Indian people
protested against the Americans' habit of eating beef, how would the
Americans answer? It is not a final, acceptable solution to the problem for
the Japanese to switch to imported beef from the United States. The ex-
istence of McDonald's outlets in Japan, alone, is not an indication that
the American food preferences have found acceptance in Japan.
A uniculture is not an ultimate goal of mankind. On the contrary,
each nation should maintain its cultural identity. A culture is in essence
diversified. Unification of food supply sources might contribute not only
to the loss of diversification of food culture, but might also be environ-
mentally dangerous. Excessive dependence on a single crop or livestock
weakens the disease-resistance capabilities of any given species. Addition-
ally, other environmental problems may surface. A good example of this
is the depletion of South American tropical rain forests due to the in-
creasing consumption of fast food beef in the United States. The Ameri-
can hamburger industry is dependent upon cheaper meat exported by
those countries who are more interested in increasing export earnings by
expanding ranch fields than they are in environmental protection. Some
environmental groups in the United States, in the cause of saving tropical
rain forests, have initiated a campaign against the eating of fast food
hamburgers.
(12) Although the U.S. initiatives in marine mammal conservation ef-
forts are praiseworthy, they are nevertheless inflexible. It becomes diffi-
cult to apply the brake to the public furor about whales and whaling. The
U.S. whaling policy is like an automobile without brakes. In 1965, U.S.
decision-makers, Ambassador William C. Herrington and U.S. Commis-
99. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee (Summary and
Recommendations to the Commission, para. 7 (1973)).
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sioner J. L. McHugh, took the view that "the best strategy was to alert
public opinion to the slow progress of the Whaling Commission." That
strategy resulted in successfully strengthening the IWC's regulations.
Then Mr. Hughes pointed out that the problem now is to halt the forces
we have set in motion before they destroy the object of our efforts."' 10
The subsequent official actions, however, have failed to cool the over-
heated public. It would be counterproductive to force a total ban on com-
mercial whaling when the IWC has succeeded in solving most of its major
problems.
B. Japan
Whales have been of benefit to the Japanese since the stone age, as
indicated by a number of whale bones found in shell mounds. Owing to
land-poor and mountainous geographical conditions that are not
favorable to the development of livestock farming and to religious con-
straints that forbade the eating of the meat of four-legged animals, the
Japanese have, from ancient times, made use of whales, together with fish
and shellfish, as a source of animal protein. For that reason, the Japanese
have traditionally treated the whale not as a marine mammal, but as a
kind of fish, although this is scientifically incorrect. It is only since the
end of the nineteenth century that the Japanese began eating beef, pork
and mutton.
From old times, the Japanese people have attempted not only to
catch stranded whales but also to hunt migrating whales. Coastal whalers
engaged in whaling by using small boats and hand harpoons. It was at
Taiji, Kishu (now Wakayama Prefecture) in 1606 that commercial whal-
ing started in an organized way in Japan. Yorimoto Wada established an
organization of whalers called "Sashite-gumi" (hand harpooners'
organization).
Using these traditional methods, however, the whalers could only
hunt right and sperm whales; other species swam too fast and sank after
their death. At the end of the seventeenth century, a new whaling method
was invented by Yoriharu Wada at Taiji. He took an idea from a spider
web and applied it to whaling. The use of whaling nets was added to
traditional whaling methods. With this unique net-whaling method, it be-
came possible to catch other fast swimming species. Afterwards, this
whaling method spread from Taiji to other regions such as Kochi,
Yamaguchi, Fukuoka and Chiba prefectures.
In 1899 the modern Japanese whaling industry evolved with the in-
troduction of Norwegian whaling techniques. The new whaling method,
using harpoon guns on the bows of steamships, made it possible for whal-
ers to hunt the fastest swimming whales such as the blue, fin, sei and
bryde's whales which could not be caught by the net-whaling method.
Until 1908, twelve whaling companies engaged in whaling in the Japan
100. J. L. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 313.
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Sea and in the coastal areas of the Pacific Ocean. However, the adoption
of the modern whaling method and rapid expansion of the industry
caused an inevitable decline in the catch. Most of the companies went out
of business for lack of whales. In 1909, the existing companies were inte-
grated into four companies. Nevertheless, coastal whaling was no longer
profitable. For that reason, since 1929, the whaling companies began to
consider participation in Antarctic whaling.
But, as a late-comer, Japan faced the difficult problem of getting the
understanding of the predecessor countries, Norway and England. In ad-
dition, there were other problems to be overcome such as the acquisition
of factory ships, catcher boats and financial and human resources.
It was in 1934 that Japan was first able to send a pelagic whaling
fleet to the Antarctic. The factory ship and catcher boats were purchased
from Norway. Two years later, another factory ship, "Nishinmaru," which
was built in Japan, was added to Japanese Antarctic whaling fleet. Four
pelagic whaling fleets were sent to the Southern Hemisphere in 1937 and
six in 1938.
Since Antarctic whaling had begun in 1904 with the Norwegian land
station on South Georgia, and had been followed by England, the
Antarctic had become the major world whaling ground by the 1920's. The
monopolistic situation of Antarctic whaling by both countries was then
broken by Japanese entry into Antarctic whaling. After 1935, Panama,
Denmark, Germany and the United States followed Japan.
It should be noted that the present endangerment of great whales
such as the blue, fin and humpback whales was caused by exploitation in
the 1920's and particularly in the beginning of the 1930's. Dr. George L.
Small states as follows:
During the 1925 whaling season in the Antarctic, 10,500 whales died.
In 1930 the figure exceeded 30,000. In 1931 the blood ran thicker and
40,200 whales died. The worst was yet to come for the whale popula-
tion as a whole, yet had already arrived for the blue whales. Between
1926 and 1930 the total catch climbed to 49,800. In the 1931 season
alone, the kill of blue whales reached an incredible 29,400, the highest
ever recorded. Never again could man find so many blue whales in one
year. 10'
A substantial drop in oil prices resulting from overproduction
brought the conclusion of a Production Agreement between Norwegian
and British whaling companies on May 9, 1932. Since the main aims of
that Agreement were to stabilize oil prices and to prevent new entry into
the industry by others, it did not effectively regulate whaling'0 2 and was
101. G. SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE 14 (1971).
102. The Agreement was not intergovernmental, but among private companies. In the
Agreement, the BWU formula was introduced for the first time. It was a little different from
the formula used in the ICRW: one blue whale equals three humpback whales which equals
five sei whales.
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terminated two years later.
Meanwhile, international concern for the future of the world's stock
of whales was expressed not only from scientific circles but also from non-
whaling countries such as France. Voices were raised concerning the need
for international regulation of the industry. Under the initiative of
France, a meeting of the League of Nations was held in Paris in 1927 to
discuss the problem and recommended that an international treaty for
regulating whaling activities be concluded. In response to that recommen-
dation, in 1930, an intergovernmental conference was held in Berlin to
consider the draft proposals of the international treaty. Japan sent two
representatives to that conference. As a result, on September 24, 1931,
the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was signed in Geneva by
twenty-six countries. It was the first treaty for regulating whaling at the
intergovernmental level. 03 It was not until January 18, 1936, however,
that the Convention went into force. The Convention was ratified by
nineteen countries, but Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union did not
adhere to it. According to the explanation of the Japanese Government,
the reasons for its non-participation were that the Soviet Union did not
accede to the Convention and that it had an objection to the application
of the prohibition of the catch of the right whales to the North Pacific.' 4
On June 8, 1937, the International Agreement for the Regulation of
Whaling"0 6 was signed in London by nine whaling countries. It came into
force provisionally on July 1, 1937 and formally on May 7, 1938. This
time, Japan did not send a delegation to the negotiating conference and
again did not accede to the Agreement. Since the duration of the Agree-
ment was for only one year, the conference to extend its duration and to
amend it was held in London in 1938. The British Government strongly
requested Japanese participation in that conference. In response to the
request, Japan sent a delegation to the conference. The Protocol amend-
ing the Agreement was signed on June 24, 1938.06 In order to induce the
Japanese Government to participate in those agreements, special consid-
erations were given in the Protocol to whaling in the North Pacific, the
oldest whaling area, in terms of minimum-length requirement and the
103. The Convention was rudimentary. Neither were minimum lengths specified nor
was any catch limit established. It only gave protection to the right whales, immature
whales and female whales accompanied by calves (arts. 4 & 5).
104. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SENGO NO HOGEI NO AYuMI (History of
Whaling after the Second World War) 13 (1964).
105. This Agreement also contained a few rudimentary limitations among which the
following were important: It was forbidden to take the grey and right whales (art. 4); As
regards the blue, fin, humpback and sperm whales, mimimum lengths were specified (art. 5);
It was prohibited to kill immature whales and female whales accompanied by calves (art. 6);
Pelagic whaling was permitted only south of 40 South Latitude during the period from Dec.
8 to March 7 (art. 7).
106. The Protocol added the following two important amendments to the Agreement: It
was forbidden to kill the humpback whale throughout the Antarctic (art. 1); A Whale Sanc-
tuary, where no whaling of baleen whales was permitted, was established in waters south of
40 South Latitude and from 70 to 160 West Longitude (art. 2).
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whaling season of the sperm whale (arts. 4 & 6). Nevertheless, Japan ad-
hered neither to the extended Agreement nor to the Protocol. In order to
remove international distrust, Japan expressed the intention to accede to
them one year later, but the outbreak of the Second World War pre-
vented it from doing so.
During the War, most of the Japanese whaling vessels were converted
to military use and destroyed. One of the most serious problems after the
War was a severe food shortage. In order to mitigate that plight, on No-
vember 3, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Allied
Occupation Forces, permitted Japan to recommence whaling within the
so-called MacArthur Line. In 1946 the General Headquarters (GHQ) al-
lowed Japan to resume Antarctic whaling. The GHQ made it a condition
that American inspectors be stationed on board to assure compliance with
existing international regulations."'7 By transforming tankers into factory
ships, two pelagic expeditions were sent to the Antarctic in that year. The
Japanese people were able to survive mainly on a diet of whale meat.
Whale was the cheapest animal protein for the ten years following
the Second World War. Until the mid 1960s, whale meat continued to be
the main source of animal protein for the Japanese. Reconstruction of the
whaling fleets proceeded slowly under the administration of the GHQ. Af-
ter 1951, when Japan's sovereignty was restored by the conclusion of a
Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers, expansion of the whaling indus-
try started in full swing. The whaling industry was financed by the Japan
Development Bank. Governmental financial aid continued unitl the mid
1960s. As a consequence, in 1954/55, the Antarctic whaling fleets in-
creased to three, in 1956/57 to five, and in 1957/58 to six. From 1960/61
to 1964/65, seven pelagic expeditions took part in Antarctic whaling.
They were the largest fleet of factory expeditions sent by Japan to the
Antarctic. Of these seven factory ships, four were second-hand vessels
bought from companies which had ceased whaling operations in Norway,
England, Panama and South Africa.
Postwar Japanese whaling was not necessarily free from domestic le-
gal restrictions. In 1949, the Fisheries Law was enacted. This Law is con-
cerned with inland-water fisheries, coastal fisheries and distant-water
fisheries, including whaling. Under the Fisheries Law, every whaling ves-
sel is required to obtain a license to operate from the Minister of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries. Licenses can be denied to prevent an exces-
sive number of vessels (art. 52). The Minister is also empowered to
specify the number and tonnage of vessels as well as the geographical area
and period of operations (art. 58). Until the mid 1960s, however, the Jap-
anese Government did not exert these powers to limit the operation of its
whaling fleets in the interests of conservation. The main concern of the
government did not lie in controlling an excessive expansion of the fleets,
107. It was in 1951 that Japan acceded to the ICRW. Therefore, even before its acces-
sion to the ICRW, Japan accepted the IWC's regulations.
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but rather in promoting the economic interests of the whaling companies.
It was by external pressures that Japan was forced to decrease the num-
ber of the whaling fleets.
As mentioned earlier, the IWC failed to take effective conservation
measures until the mid 1960s. However, the IWC succeded in reducing
the Antarctic quota in 1963/64 from 15,000 to 10,000 BWU and in fixing
the total maximum catch in 1965/66 in the Antarctic at 4,500 BWU.
These steps represented a great economic sacrifice for Japan. In the sub-
sequent years, further reductions in the Antarctic quota were made by
the IWC. In response to the sharp quota reductions, Japan was forced to
decrease the number of fleets it sent to the Antarctic.
In the 1970s, the situation became more unfavorable to the Japanese
whaling industry. It became difficult for so many whaling companies to
operate competitively in the Antarctic. For that reason, by integrating
whaling divisions of the three fishing companies (Taiyo Fishing Co., Nis-
sui Fishing Co. and Kyokuyo Fishing Co.) and three whaling companies
(Nihon Whaling Co., Nitto Whaling Co. and Hokuyo Whaling Co.), "Nip-
pon Kyodou Hogei Co." was established in 1976. Even with that measure,
the whaling industry found it hard to maintain itself. In 1977, the newly
established company was forced to reduce whaling fleets from three to
one, because catch quotas were reduced by half. The adoption of the mor-
atorium decision by the IWC in 1982 struck a decisive blow to Japanese
commercial whaling. Japan filed an objection to that decision according to
article V, paragraph 3 of the ICRW. However, in 1984, under strong polit-
ical and economic pressures by the United States, Japan was forced to
withdraw its objection. According to the decision of the Japanese Govern-
ment to accept the moratorium of the IWC, the last remaining whaling
company was dissolved on November 27, 1987.
Lastly, additional reference must be made to the problem of pirate
whaling. Pirate whaling impaired to a considerable extent the interna-
tional image of Japanese whaling. In addition to Japan's intransigent atti-
tudes toward international regulations of whaling until the mid 1960s,
Japanese failure to have quickly responded to control of unauthorized
whaling contributed to the formation of the image of Japan as a law-
breaker and gave extremist environmentalists an excuse for the morato-
rium on commercial whaling.
The IWC was informed of illegal whaling by the ship "Sierra" in Oc-
tober 1975. The Sierra was originally the whaler-catcher AM No. 4, which
was launched in 1960 in the Netherlands. When Dutch whaling ended in
1966, the ship underwent conversion in Rotterdam. This conversion ena-
bled the ship not only to catch whales but also to process them. In 1968,
the ship was renamed the Run, registered to the Run Fishing Company in
the Bahamas, and began catching and processing whales in the South At-
lantic. From 1968 to 1971, the Run was based at Cape Town. In 1971, the
Supreme Court in Cape Town ordered the attachment of Run's cargo. In
the following year, the Run Fishing Company was fined US $10,000 by
the Government of the Bahamas for illegal whaling. The company de-
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clared itself bankrupt. 0 8
In the same year, the Run was renamed the Sierra and resumed
whaling. The ship flew the Somali flag. The registered owner was the Nor-
wegian Forretningsbanken A/S. It caught most frequently dei and
bryde's whales, and as chance offered, took endangered species such as
blue, humpback and right whales. The Sierra's master and first officer
were Norwegians and the chief engineer was British. Four Japanese meat
inspectors were aboard to buy all the meat from whales taken and
processed by the ship. Japan imported whale meat under the name of the
produce of Spain or Somalia. An unsigned Confirmation of Order dated
June 4, 1973 revealed that Taiyo (Canada) Ltd., a subsidiary of Taiyo
Fishing Co. in Japan, was involved in the trade. 9
In 1977, as a result of U.S. pressure on the Somali Government, Si-
erra's registration was changed again, this time to Sierra, Ltd., at Limas-
sol in Cyprus. Most of the shares of that firm belonged to Beacon Sierra
Ltd., in Liechtenstein. In 1978, Japan began to import whale meat from
Cyprus."'
Early in 1978 the Sierra was joined in Las Palmas, Spain, by the
Tonna, a Japanese built vessel, originally named Shunyo Maru. The reg-
istered owner of the Tonna was the Dutch company, Red Mullet Shipping
Company, in Curacao. The Tonna acted as factory ship and the Sierra as
the killer-factory. The master of the Tonna was Norwegian. The crew was
made up of Norwegians, Spaniards, South Africans and others, and in-
cluded three Japanese inspectors. On July 22, 1978, the weight of the
whales caused the ship to founder about 220 miles off the Portuguese
coast. The survivors were rescued by a Greek vessel."'
In 1979, the Cape Fisher, which was the former Japanese trawler
Yashima Maru, took the place of the Tonna. It was owned by Sierra Ltd.,
Limassol. The master was Portuguese and most of the crew were former
crewmen of the Tonna. There were Portuguese, Norwegian, British, and
four Japanese."'
From May to June of 1979, the Sierra appeared at Aveiro and Leix-
oes in Portugal. At Las Palmas or Leixoes, the Sierra transferred whale
meat to Japanese cargo vessels such as Osaka Reefer, Yamato Reefer,
Nipponham Maru No 1, Snowflower, Juyo Maru, Hayashikane Maru No
1 and Kunisaki Maru."' In the same year, while the Sierra was operating
off the Portuguese coast, it suffered an attack by the Sea Shepherd which
carried seventeen anti-whaling people. On Febuary 6, 1980, while the Si-
erra was at anchor for repair in Port Lisbon, it suffered an explosion and
108. PEOPLE'S TRUST FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES, PIRATE WHALING 5-6 (1979).
109. Id. at 10, 15.
110. Id. at 12, 21.
111. Id. at 21-24.
112. Id. at 34-36.
113. Id. at 18, 21 & Addenda.
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sank into the sea.
The above-mentioned chronological facts show that a few Japanese
personnel were involved in the Sierra's operations, that ex-Japanese ves-
sels were used for pirate-whaling, and that Japan provided the market for
the produce of non-IWC whalers. Whale oil went to the European mar-
ket. Other IWC member countries such as England and Norway were in-
volved in the problem in terms of financial and human resources and of
technology transfer.
In the meantime, the IWC made efforts to prevent IWC members
from becoming involved in whaling under flags of convenience. Under the
U.S. initiative, the IWC, at its 28th Annual Meeting in 1976, adopted a
resolution recommending that the IWC's member countries take the fol-
lowing measures to:
(1) prohibit the sale, charter, transfer, loan or delivery of vessels,
equipment or supplies likely to be used for whaling operations to any
nation or entity under the jurisdiction of any nation which is not a
member of the IWC; and (2) take all practicable steps to discourage
the dissemination by its citizens of expertise and assistance necessary
to the conduct of whaling operations in any form, including, but not
limited to (a) the training of personnel; (b) the designing of ships,
land stations, or other facilities to be used in the conduct of whaling
operations; and (c) financial aid for whaling operations; to any nation
or any entity under the jurisdiction of any nation which is not a mem-
ber of the IWC." 4
At a Special Meeting of the IWC, which was held in Tokyo on December
6 & 7, 1977, Japan reported that,
[I]t is their practice not to authorize the transfer or sale of whaling
vessels and equipment to non-member whaling nations.., with great
respect to restrictions on imports of whale products from non-IWC
nations, there are difficulties arising from other treaty obligations
such as GATT, but steps are being taken to discourage such
imports." 5
At the 30th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1978, Japan reported its
compliance with LWC's resolutions dealing with the prohibition of impor-
tation of whale products from non-member countries and the prohibition
of the transfer of whaling vessels and equipment and other types of assis-
tance to non-member countries.116
At its 31st Annual Meeting in 1979, the IWC resolved as follows:
All member nations shall cease immediately any importation of whale
meat and products from, and the export of whaling vessels and equip-
ment to non-member countries and operations. With respect to any
international efforts to negotiate a new convention for the protection
114. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., Appendix 5, (1976).
115. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Special Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 12 (1977).
116. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 30th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 22 (1978).
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and conservation of whales, all member nations shall support a textual
prohibition on any importation of whale meat and products from, and
the export of whaling vessels and equipment to non-member countries
and operations, and all member countries consider through the appli-
cation of national legislation, prohibiting whaling by non-member
countries within their fishery conservation zones. I1
It was on July 5, 1979 that Japan took formal legal measures to pro-
hibit the import of whale products from non-IWC member countries and
to prohibit the transfer of whaling tools to them. Pirate whaling was un-
authorized and clearly illegal. It was irrelevant to whaling by Nippon Ky-
odou Hogei Co. which was authorized by the Japanese Government. How-
ever, selfish and greedy pursuit of economic interests by many Japanese
and delay of a governmental response undermined considerably the credi-
bility of Japanese whaling and accelerated an international public outcry
against whaling.
To conclude, the characteristics of the Japanese decision-making pro-
cess might be summarized as follows:
(1) Japanese traditional whaling methods, which were represented by
the net-whaling method, did not cause overexploitation of whale re-
sources. They were in harmony with the natural mechanism. However,
the introduction of the modern whaling method by steam-driven vessels
with harpoon guns brought about a complete change in whaling practice.
It encouraged ecologically insensitive commercial whaling.
(2) Since the Japanese had regarded whales as a kind of fish, little
thought had been given to conservation of wildlife or marine mammals.
For a long time, the Japanese considered whale resources not as res com-
munis, but as res nullius. It was not until the 1970s that Japan came to
understand the real need for conservation of whale resources as a com-
mon heritage of mankind.
(3) In the prewar days, Japan acted passively to the international
regulations of whaling. Japan never participated in international agree-
ments on whaling. This generated distrust of Japan among other coun-
tries. Such distrust was intensified by a passive attitude to the quota re-
strictions by the IWC in the 1950s and 1960s.
(4) Lack of concern for resource management is reflected in the ab-
sence of effective domestic legislation on whaling. In comparison with the
Norwegian Whaling Act of 1929, which became the model of the Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling in 1931, the Japanese Factory Vessel
Law of 1933 was less stringent and less strictly enforced. The same is true
of the Fisheries Law of 1949.
(5) Past Japanese whaling policy was biased toward the promotion of
the whaling industry. Throughout the prewar and postwar periods, eco-
nomic considerations were given much weight. Japanese whaling activities
117. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., Appendix 9 (1979).
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were governed by short-range economic considerations rather than by the
requirements of conservation.
(6) Reduced catch limits and increasing costs of Antarctic whaling
since the mid 1960s forced a series of readjustments in the fleets of whal-
ing countries. As a consequence, England, Norway and the Netherlands
decided to drop out of Antarctic whaling by transferring their fleets and
quota shares to Japan. Japan increased its share through the purchase of
the factory ships of those countries. This was due to the fact that the
Japanese whaling industry had higher operating profits than other com-
petitors as a result of the several advantages it derived from whale meat.
(7) Policy efforts for reduction of excessive whaling fleets were the
result of the strengthening of international regulations on whaling. How-
ever, the turning point for Japanese whaling came in 1982, when the IWC
adopted the moratorium decision on commercial whaling. It was an ap-
palling shock to the Japanese whaling companies, for they had made the
necessary economic adjustments according to reduced catch limits.
(8) Except in the case of its active cooperation in Antarctic minke
whale research under the IDCR, Japan has never played a constructive
role in building up a better management system of whale resources. In-
stead of acting in a productive way, a passive emotional approach based
upon an inferiority complex has prevailed among the Japanese people.
Many opinion leaders have often made mention of racial discrimination
or "bashing" of the Japanese.
VI. WHALE WAR
A. First Round
At its 33rd Annual Meeting in 1981, the IWC amended the Schedule
for the Western Division stock of North Pacific sperm whales to establish
what was effectively a zero catch limit. On November 9, 1981, Japan filed
an objection to this amendment under article V, paragraph 3 of the
ICRW. In 1982, Japan succeeded in obtaining an IWC revision of this
zero quota for the following two harvest seasons. ' Moreover, as men-
tioned above, in 1982 the IWC decided on a five-year moratorium on
commercial whaling beginning in 1986. Japan, along with the Soviet
Union and Norway, lodged an objection to this decision on November 4,
1982. To these Japanese actions, the United States made protests and
suggested sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the
Pelly Amendment. The linkage between fish and whales was a strong
pressure to Japan.
In order to avoid a diplomatic confrontation with the United States,
Japan entered into discussions with the Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
118. At its 34th Annual Meeting in 1982, the IWC reconsidered the matter and agreed
that, "catch limits for the 1982 and 1983 coastal seasons are 450 and 400 whales respec-
tively." See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 13, (1982).
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Baldrige and Secretary of State George Shultz, in an attempt to resolve
differences between the two countries over whaling issues. Japan was
compelled to make a hard policy choice of whether to continue whaling at
the cost of fish allocation in the U.S. 200-mile waters. The fear of reduc-
tion of fish allocation narrowed the scope of the Japanese policy.
These discussions resulted, on November 13, 1984, in an exchange of
letters between Yasushi Murazumi, charge d'affaires of Japan in the
United States, and the Secretary of Commerce. In the Murazumi-Bal-
drige Agreement, Japan was obliged to make one-sided concessions. In
that Agreement, Japan made two promises to the United States. One was
to withdraw its objection to the sperm whale quota; another was to with-
draw its objection to the moratorium decision of the IWC and to end all
commercial whaling by April 1, 1988. The United States in turn agreed
not to certify Japan under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments.
Meanwhile, Greenpeace and other major environmental groups in the
United States filed suit on November 8, 1984, about three weeks after the
negotiations between both countries commenced, requesting that the U.S.
District Court in the District of Columbia order the Secretary of Com-
merce to certify Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly Amend-
ments. The Japanese Whaling Association and the Japanese Fishing As-
sociation participated in the case as defendant-intervenors.
On March 5, 1985, the case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
Charles R. Richey, U.S. District Court Judge, ruled that "the defendant
Baldridge (sic) and his subordinates, and defendant Shultz and his subor-
dinates, have no discretion not to certify Japanese sperm whaling in vio-
lation of the IWC zero sperm whale quota, and reduce Japan's fishing
allocation since such activities diminish the effectiveness of the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling," and ordered that "de-
fendant Baldridge (sic) shall forthwith certify to the President, pursuant
to the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, the Japanese sperm
whaling which has taken place in violation of the IWC sperm whaling
quota.'9
In response to the District Court decision, Japan indicated that it
would not withdraw its general objection to the moratorium on April 1,
1985, as agreed. It also indicated, however, that if the decision of the Dis-
trict Court were reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, it would
be prepared to withdraw that objection within five days of the new
decision.
The U.S. Government immediately appealed the ruling. However, the
Court of Appeals upheld the judgement of the District Court. The Court
said as follows: "Where a foreign nation allows its nationals to fish in
excess of recommendations set forth by an international fishery conserva-
119. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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tion program, it has per se diminished the effectiveness of that program.
In such a case, the Secretary is mandated to certify the foreign country
under the Pelly Amendment. Specifically, where a foreign country's na-
tionals harvest whales in excess of IWC harvest quotas, certification is
mandatory and nondiscretionary."'' O
In the course of the trial, intervenor-appellants Japan Fisheries Asso-
ciation and Japan Whaling Association argued that "certification and the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to such certification are violations of in-
ternational law when applied to a validly objecting member insofar as the
Convention requirements are not effective with respect to such a mem-
ber."12 However, such an argument was rejected by the Court which said
as follows: "There is no prohibition in the Convention against member
nations acting unilaterally to force an objecting member (or non-member)
to comply with the Convention's regulations, even where those regula-
tions are not binding on the member (or nonmember) under the terms of
the Convention itself." 22 This interpretation is against the fundamental
principle of international law, especially the Law of Treaties, pacta sunt
sevanda. The result is the law of the jungle.
In the disenting opinion, U.S. District Court Judge Oberdorfer wrote:
"I cannot agree that, in the circumstances of this case, the Pelly Amend-
ment..., should be construed to impose upon the Secretary of Commerce
a ministerial duty to certify Japan solely because it is not adhering to an
international whaling quota which is not binding on it."' 2 3 From the legal
point of view, Judge Oberdorfer was accurate in his interpretation of the
ICRW. However, the majority opinion was based upon the mistaken in-
terpretation of the ICRW, especially in saying that Japan violates IWC
whaling quotas.
The Case was then brought before the Supreme Court of the United
States by the U.S. Government. In the petition, it was emphasized that
foreign affairs is the province of the Executive Branch. In addition, it was
pointed out that "Japan has an unchallenged and unchallengeable right
to free itself of quotas established by the IWC by filing objections to
them," and that "Japan could not violate the quotas because, by its ob-
jections, the quotas were not applicable to it."124 The Court ruled against
the plaintiffs. As a result, in accord with the Murazumi-Baldrige Agree-
ment, Japan withdrew the objection to the sperm whale quota and the
objection to the moratorium decision. At any rate, Japan lost the first
round of the "whaling war."
120. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 768 F.2d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(summarizing congressional intent with regard to the Pelly Amendment).
121. Id. at 429, n. 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 445.
124. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (quoting
from the Petition for Certiorari, No. 85-954, filed Dec. 4, 1985, 19-20).
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B. Second Round
As mentioned before, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Japan
presented a research program. In explaining the rationale behind the pro-
gram, Japan emphasized that the undertaking of scientific research is a
matter of duty for the member countries of the ICRW, and said that "Ja-
pan neither believes that the cessation of the commercial whaling subse-
quent to the moratorium decision exempts the Contracting Governments
from such duties, nor does it believe that it is proper to disrupt the con-
tinuous progress being made on the study on the whales. 1 2 5 In this re-
spect, Japan pointed out that the Comprehensive Assessment is the most
important task before the IWC .and stated as follows:
A number of immediate results from this program will be available for
the Comprehensive Assessment in 1990, while the long-term results
will contribute to information essential for rational management of
minke whale stocks.... The program will contribute to the Compre-
hensive Assessment by providing age structure data free from the se-
lectivities of the commercial catch. These will be used to improve the
analysis of historical data. 126
However, the Japanese explanation was not understood by the anti-
whaling countries and the IWC adopted the Resolution recommending
that the Government of Japan refrain from issuing the special permit.
Japan expressed its dissapointment at the adoption of the Resolution.
The Japanese legal position on this problem was that under article VIII,
paragraph 1 of the ICRW, member countries have the legitimate right to
issue special permits for scientific whaling. However, in order to avoid a
diplomatic confrontation, even after the Meeting, Japan had several ne-
gotiations with the anti-whaling countries, particularly with the United
States, to secure their understanding. For that reason, a Special Meeting
of the Scientific Committee was held at Cambridge from December 15 to
17, 1987. But, no agreement was reached in that Meeting. Thus, consulta-
tions ended in failure. In such a situation, the Japanese Government de-
cided to undertake a "Feasibility Study." On December 1987, a research
cruise set sail for the Antarctic.
To this Japanese action, environmental groups in the United States
raised voices of protest. On January 13, 1988, Greenpeace and twelve
other environmental groups sued the U.S. Government to force sanctions
against Japan. In the lawsuit, it was claimed that since Japan's "scien-
tific" whaling expedition was merely a ruse to evade the IWC moratorium
on commercial whaling, it violated the moratorium decision, and it also
infringed upon a 1984 agreement with the United States to halt whaling
in 1988.
125. Government of Japan, The program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
(1987).
126. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Report of the Scientific Commmittee (1987).
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Although the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) had not taken part in the
suit in 1984, it did so this time. WWF President William K. Reilly said
that the "World Wildlife Fund did not join in that action because we
were assured that Japan would live up to its side of the bargain," but
"clearly . . .and sadly . . .we were mistaken." '
The WWF's decision seems to be based upon the following observa-
tion of its research scientist Dr. Roger Payne who occupies the seat of
Antigua & Barbuda in the IWC:
Japan claims that it needs to kill these whales for scientific research,
to find out how many are left for future hunts. They're really trying to
skirt the whaling moratorium and the deal they made with Secretary
Baldridge (sic). There is nothing scientific about killing 875 whales
and selling the meat. It's just a scam cloaked, unfortunately, in
pseudo-science.128
It is truly regrettable that the WWF, with a worldwide reputation,
has been influenced by the narrow-minded and prejudiced view of a radi-
cal protectionist. That careless decision has undermined the credibility of
the WWF, at least in Japan. It should be noted that even in the United
States, other environmental organizations such as the Environmental De-
fense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Policy
Institute and the International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment have taken a neutral position on the problem.
At the instigation of extremist environmentalists, on February 10,
1988, the Secretary of Commerce, C. William Verity, certified that Japan
is whaling in a way that diminishes the effectiveness of the ICRW. Upon
the certification by the Secretary, on April 6, President Ronald Reagan
applied to Japan the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. As a sanction,
denial of Japanese fishing rights in the U.S. 200-mile zone had no real
effect on the Japanese fishing industry, because no quotas were allocated
to Japanese fishermen that year. However, it seems that its real aim was
in excluding Japanese fishing vessels from the U.S. 200-mile zone. The
U.S. Government took advantage of whaling as an excuse for refusing ac-
cess of Japanese fishing vessels to the U.S. 200-mile zone and for mono-
polizing fishery resources in that zone.
VII. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE U.S. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
A whaling problem is irrelevant to a fishing problem. The conserva-
tion measures should be taken on a species by species basis. Certainly,
further studies should be directed to the problems of competition be-
tween species of whales and of relationships with other marine organisms.
127. World Wildlife Fund, Press Release (Sept. 1, 1987).
128. Id. at 2.
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However, such studies should be conducted according to the whales' mi-
gratory nature.
Under international law, there is nothing to prevent a coastal state
from setting standards on whaling within its 200-mile zone which are
stricter than international standards. However, beyond national jurisdic-
tion of coastal states, it is the IWC that establishes regulations on whales
and whaling.129 In addition, it is each member country that ensures their
implementation.
Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, reference is made to
another country's activity which "diminishes the effectiveness" of the
ICRW. Consequently, even with respect to the legitimate activity of a
country, if the Secretary of Commerce certifies as diminishing the effec-
tiveness of the ICRW, sanctions are directed at that country. Such unilat-
eral action is against international law. It is not a reprisal, which is recog-
nized under general international law, which may be taken against an
illegal action of another country.
Another problem concerns the access of other countries to the sur-
plus of fishery resources within the U.S. 200-mile zone. Whether the right
of access of other countries to the surplus of fishery resources within the
200-mile zone of a coastal state should be recognized was one of the sub-
jects in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Af-
ter prolonged negotiations, both the principle of "optimum utilization"
and the obligation of the coastal state to give other states access to the
surplus were confirmed.'30
It is certain that the United States has neither signed nor ratified the
Law of the Sea Convention, so that it is not bound by the Convention.
129. Article 65 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was
incorporated by the proposal of the United States, provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of
an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.
States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and
in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate inter-
national organizations for their conservation, management and study.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF.62/122, at 27 (1982)[hereinafter Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L M. 1261,
1282 (1982).
130. The Convention provides:
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources
of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the ca-
pacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or
other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regula-
tions referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the
allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of article 69 and 70,
especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
Id., at art. 62, para. 1-2, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1281.
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However, the concept of the 200-mile zone is based on the Convention; it
cannot have its cake and eat it too. Therefore, denial of the surplus prin-
ciple itself is not permissible under the 200-mile concept.
B. Pelly Amendment
Under the Pelly Amendment, the President, upon receipt of certifica-
tion by the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to prohibit the importa-
tion of fish products from the offending country for a period that the
President decides is appropriate and to the extent that such a prohibition
is permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Although such an embargo is required to be consistent with GATT, its
achievement might be very difficult, since the various legal issues cannot
be overcome. Firstly, an embargo cannot meet the requirement of the
"general elimination of quantitative restrictions" under article XI of
GATT.13 '
Secondly, an embargo of fish products cannot constitute the exemp-
tion provided in article XX of GATT. 32 There is no connection between
fish products and whale products. With respect to fish products, no legiti-
mate connection with conservation needs as required by the article can be
found. If such an arbitrary and unjustifiable measure is permitted, all
thorny trade problems between Japan and the United States concerning
beef, oranges and rice might be easily solved. Therefore, there is no doubt
that an embargo on imports of fish products, other than whale products,
is inconsistent with this article.
VIII. JAPAN'S POLICY OPTIONS
So far Japan has not chosen to take countermeasures to U.S. whaling
policies, in particular, sanctions. However, facing strong U.S. political and
economic pressures, the Japanese Government will be obliged to choose
any of the following policy alternatives:
(1) To accept the U.S. argument and to stop the ongoing research
131. "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be insti-
tuted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any prod-
uct destined for the territory of any other contracting party." General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, para. 1, 61 Stat. A5, A32, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 226 [hereinafter GATT].
132.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such mea-
sures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic produc-
tion or consumption.
Id., at art. XX, para. 1(g), 61 Stat. at A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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* program. In this case, it will result in the collapse of the Japanese whaling
industry. More importantly, however, since there is no rational ground for
the U.S. pressures, the Japanese will lose the feeling of respect for Ameri-
cans which has been nourished for a long time.
(2) To cease the Antarctic whaling, but instead to receive recognition
by the IWC of the continuance of shore-based small-type whaling as
"subsistence whaling";
(3) To continue the present research program by claiming that issu-
ing a special permit is the legitimate right of a member country under the
ICRW. In this case, the research whaling issue will continue to pose a
threat of friction between Japan and the United States;
(4) To show the firm Japanese belief that scientific permit whaling is
in conformity with the ICRW, and to impose anti-sanction sanctions
against the United States, namely to embargo the importation of fish
products or agricultural products from the United States. At present, Ja-
pan is facing strong requests to increase imports of fish and agricultural
products from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and developing countries.
Accordingly, this might be a good chance to diversify trade partners;
(5) Another alternative to the above-mentioned measure is to with-
draw from the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC) entered into by Japan, the United
States and Canada. Once freed of its obligations under the INPFC, Japan
could engage in catching North American salmon in the high seas outside
the U.S. 200-mile zone. Similarly, consideration might be given to the
withdrawal from the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission;
(6) As a more radical countermeasure, to refuse the provision of the
U.S. military bases in Japan by abrogating the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty. The adoption of neutral policy by Japan might contribute to the
establishment of its truly independent status and to the achievement of
world peace without arms races;
(7) To submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Since there is a legal dispute concerning the interpretation of provisions
of the ICRW, in particular of the Preamble, paragraph 3 of article V,
article VI, and paragraph 1 of article VII, submission of the dispute to the
ICJ is the best recourse;
(8) To ask for an advisory opinion of the ICJ on legal questions such
as the validity of the moratorium decision or the compatibility of resolu-
tions restricting issuance of special permits by member countries with the
ICRW. Certainly, the IWC is not a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions. Therefore, the IWC itself is not entitled to ask for such an advisory
opinion of the ICJ. However, it might be possible to do so through the
General Assembly or FAO;1 3
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 96 provides:
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(9) To continue to request that the IWC rectify matters and normal-
ize its functions. It should be noted that the moratorium decision is not
unconditional. It is provided for that the Comprehensive Assessment to
review the decision is to be undertaken in 1990. It should not be forgotten
that such a review must be "based upon the best scientific advice";
In the moratorium recommendation adopted under the initiative of
the United States in the U.N. Stockholm Conference in 1972, reference is
made to strengthening of the IWC and increasing international efforts. As
regards the former, the permanent Secretariat of the IWC was set up in
1976, and Dr. R. Gambell, a whale biologist, was appointed to be its full-
time Secretary and Mr. M. Harvey was nominated Executive Officer.
However, financial problems remain unsolved.
With respect to the latter, as mentioned before, the United States
proposed to initiate the IDCR in 1975. In the resolution adopted by the
IWC, particular emphasis is on the needs of stock monitoring and stock
identification in the Southern Hemisphere. The resolution also refers to
the decision of indicating "to UNEP that its assistance would be most
useful in aiding IWC member nations in stock monitoring and stock iden-
tification cruises in the Southern Hemisphere."'' According to this reso-
lution, Japan has made the best efforts in Antarctic minke whale re-
search. On the other hand, the United States has made little effort to
research the resource state in the Antarctic. And after the adoption of the
moratorium decision, it has never referred to the need "to increase inter-
national research efforts" and only spoken of "uncertainties" of the re-
source state.
Under such a situation, it is undoubtedly difficult to increase re-
search capability of the IWC and to strengthen its rational and effective
resource management mechanism. However, Japan should make every
constructive effort to improve the IWC and show that "the pen is might-
ier than the sword;"
(10) When there is no prospect of improvement of the IWC, to with-
draw from it. The All Japan Seamen's Union has suggested such an op-
tion by announcing the following:
We have no choice but to demand the Japanese Government to with-
draw from the IWC, in the event the IWC is: (a) not able to carry out
its function as an organisation established in pursuit of the objective
of the International Whaling Convention, 1946; (b) unable to recog-
nize the freedom of scientific study and research activities which will
be conducted by a certain number of the contracting governments; (c)
1. The General Assembly of the Security Council may request the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at
any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities.
134. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., No. 27, at 10 (1977).
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incapable of upholding a fair and comprehensive assessment of infor-
mation obtained by scientific viewpoints.""
IX. PROSPECTS OF THE JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP OVER THE WHALING
PROBLEM
The United States was a primary mover in the establishment of a
world public order after the Second World War. For a long period, Ameri-
can democracy and rationalism have been a goal for the Japanese. How-
ever, recently, America has lost its generosity and fair-mindedness. It has
jeopardized its leadership in the international community by taking ques-
tionable unilateral actions with its whaling policy as a typical example.
Past history shows that lack of religious and cultural tolerance has
often been an important cause of international frictions. Foreign policy
without regard to diversification of value systems in the international
community invites solely an unnecessary diplomatic confrontation. Still
more, a policy of imposing the concepts of one way of thinking upon
others who do not share those same values should be avoided in the inter-
national arena. In this sense, the imposition of political and economic
pressures upon the whaling countries, instead of reasonable consultations
for better management of the magnificent creatures of the earth, would
set back the present and future credibility of the United States. Continu-
ation of the present inflexible U.S. whaling policy might play havoc with
Japan-U.S. relations. It should be noted that a unilateral action by the
United States, or by any other country, is not a viable alternative to the
effective conservation of whale resources.
In 1984, Japan was obliged to withdraw its objection to the morato-
rium decision of the IWC as a result of the political and economic pres-
sures of the United States. Once again, the United States is attempting to
compel Japan to cease scientific permit whaling by invoking domestic leg-
islation, namely, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the Pelly
Amendment.
It is the legitimate right of a member country of the ICRW to file an
objection to a Schedule amendment or to issue a special permit for scien-
tific whaling. If a member country were free to coerce other member
countries to abstain from the exercise of treaty rights by the threat of
sanctions under domestic legislation, it would vitiate the fundamental
concept of treaty-making itself. It is a denial of the existence of interna-
tional law and a "might is right" type of approach.
It is the fundamental principle of international law that a state can-
not invoke national law to evade obligations under international law. The
logical corollary is that if domestic legislation of a state is against interna-
tional law, that state should rectify such an irregularity according to in-
ternational law. Instead of revising its domestic legislation, the United
135. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Rep./Opening Statement 39th Annual Mtg., at 3 (1987).
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States has imposed sanctions upon the exercise of legitimate rights by
other countries.
As long as the United States continues to interpret arbitrarily the
ICRW and to invoke domestic legislation in order to force its own value
standard upon other countries, settlement of the dispute will be difficult
by direct negotiations between Japan and the United States. The past
history of bilateral negotiations on this problem shows that the more Ja-
pan makes concessions, the more the United States escalates its requests.
Therefore, the issue should be left to the means of a third party settle-
ment. In this context, the most appropriate way is to bring the dispute
before the ICJ. Another choice would be to constitute an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal by a compromise between the two countries. The third option is
to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ through the FAO or the General
Assembly.
Yet, if the United States is reluctant to bring the problem before the
international judicial organs, Japan will be obliged to seek ways to solve
the issue by itself. Unless Japan yields to outrageous U.S. pressure, it will
have to consider taking countermeasures against the U.S. actions.
Under international law, it is in principle prohibited to resort to self-
help. However, in an exceptional case, that is, when there is an interna-
tional delict, recourse to reprisals is permissible under international law.
A reprisal is defined in general as "[Aicts which, although normally ille-
gal, are exceptionally permitted as reaction of one state against a viola-
tion of its right by another state." ' The United States has committed an
international delict, because it has taken actions which are not authorized
by international law, that is, by the ICRW. Consequently, if the United
States continues to impose illegal economic sanctions upon Japan, the
latter will be entitled to resort to reprisals. In this respect, the aforemen-
tioned measures might be taken.
Lastly, it must be added that the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement in
1984 is void ab initio, because it was concluded under coercion. In view of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this interpretation is jus-
tified, because it provides that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations" (article
52). 111 Although there is a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of
the word "force", that is to say, as to whether it is only concerned with
armed force or if it includes political or economic pressures, the travaux
preparatoires of this article shows that its meaning is open-ended. 3 ' In
136. H. KELSEN, PRICIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2d. ed. 1966).
137. The Charter provides that "[AIll Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
138. In the drafting process of this article, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur,
said that "the text is open-ended in the sense that any future interpretation of the law of
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addition, in the Vienna Convention, the prohibition of "the threat or use
of force" is regarded as a typical example of jus cogens, that is, a peremp-
tory norm of general international law from which no derogation is per-
mitted (article 53).1s9
Since the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement was brought about by the
threat of sanctions under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ments, which is against the clear-cut prohibition of the threat or use of
force in article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and
also against jus cogens, it is of dubious legal validity. The free and volun-
tary consent of Japan to the Agreement is vitiated by the illegal threat of
sanctions. Therefore, the Agreement is an absolute and automatic nullity.
X. CONCLUSION
It is true that residual effects of 19th century whaling remain. Due to
past heavy exploitation, some whale species have been in danger of ex-
tinction. Even after the establishment of the IWC in 1946, many of its
regulations were not necessarily effective, especially until the mid 1960s,
because short-term economic considerations overrode long-term conserva-
tion needs. This was symbolized in the adoption of the BWU. However,
since the mid 1960s the IWC has come to grips with its problems and its
shortcomings have been corrected.
In addition to the right and gray whales, the catching of which was
prohibited since prewar days, the IWC decided to forbid the catching of
the humpback whale in 1963 and the blue whale in 1964. And, as Dr. J. L.
McHugh says, "the turning point came in 1965, when for the first time in
its history the Commission agreed to establish a catch limit in the
Antarctic lower than the best scientific estimate of the sustainable yield."
He mentions the following:
The sharp quota reductions in 1965 and subsequently were a remarka-
ble victory for the Commission. This was the first indication that the
Whaling Commission might become an effective organization. Its crit-
ics have failed to recognize this important point or have chosen to
ignore it. The widespread recent publicity in the press, in magazines,
and on radio and television in the United States has verged on the
irresponsible and has led people generally to believe that the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission has been completely ineffective. ""
Following the adoption of the International Observer Scheme in
1971, separate quotas by species for the Antarctic whaling were intro-
the Charter would affect the rule embodied in article 36 (present article 52)." Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 120 (1966).
139. According to the explanation of the International Law Commission, "[Tihe law of
the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous
example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens." Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 76, para. 1 (1966).
140. J. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 311, 331.
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duced in 1972 in lieu of the BWU. As to this measure, the Scientific Com-
mittee stated that "this is the most rational way of managing stocks from
a biological point of view." 1" In this context, it should be noted that the
resource management system under the NMP is stringent enough to en-
sure that all stocks are maintained at levels that will not significantly in-
crease the risk of biological extinction.
It was extremely tragic that the IWC decided on a moratorium on
commercial whaling. On this point, the FAO observer at the 34th Annual
Meeting of the IWC in 1982 stated:
The continuation of commercial whaling can also be threatened by
management measures that are too restrictive. The most extreme ex-
ample is a moratorium on all whaling. This is a completely unselective
measure. Given the differing status of the various stocks, and the fact
that virtually all those species or stocks that are seriously depleted are
already receiving complete protection, there seems to be no scientific
justification for a global moratorium. A justification for a complete
cessation of whaling can be put forward on aesthetic or moral
grounds, but these seem outside the terms of reference of the
Commission."4 2
By its deviation from the original objectives and purposes, the IWC
has lost its raison d'etre. The moratorium decision has undermined the
credibility of the IWC in the international community. Unless the IWC
rectifies matters and normalizes its functions, its collapse will be inevita-
ble. It goes without saying that unregulated whaling is undesirable. The
"tragedy of the commons" should not be repeated in the future. What is
needed at present is a rational and reasonable way of thinking. Without
it, this intricate problem is unsolvable.
There are divergent views on whether or not whales can be properly
managed as common resources under the nation-state system. However,
since it seems unlikely that a world government will emerge in the near
future, the best should be done under the present nation-state system.
Maurice F. Strong, former Executive Director of the United Nations En-
vironment Programme (UNEP), has stated:
What is needed is a global framework within which national action
can be seen and taken in relation to the global concerns on which they
impact. The role of international organizations is to provide that
framework - and the services, linkages, and mechanisms for coopera-
tion which permit nations to unite in a common approach to particu-
lar problems and issues. For it is not by abdication of national sover-
eignties that we will achieve the reality of the 'new internationalism',
but by the evolution of new concepts of sovereignty and more effective
means for the exercise of national sovereignty on a collective basis in
those areas in which it is not feasible or desirable to exercise it unilat-
erally. This will not be accomplished by dismantling the present na-
141. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Rep. of the Scientific Committee (1972).
142. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg./Statement by FAO Observer (1982).
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tion-state system and building a new world 'super government.'
Rather, it can best be accomplished by step-by-step building on the
present nation-state system, and on the system of international orga-
nizations which has grown out of it, a much stronger and more effec-
tive system of international organizations that can provide the inter-
national services for consultation and cooperation that the nation-
states will more and more require and provide them with the instru-
mentalities for carrying out those common tasks which it is either not
feasible or not advantageous for them to carry out themselves.
14 3
Fortunately, the international community has a global framework for
regulating national actions on whales and whaling. The problem is how to
operate it rationally and effectively, and how to improve its existing
shortcomings. In this respect, particular consideration should be paid to
the improvements of the IWC, especially in terms of financing and scien-
tific activities.
The IWC faces serious financial problems. Its financial base is ex-
tremely weak. This situation is aggravated by late payment and non-pay-
ment of contributions by some member countries. It is reported that
"nearly half of the member governments have not paid their required
contributions nine months after they were due."""' As a consequence, the
IWC has been forced to reduce its expenditures to the lowest possible
level.
In order to deal with the present financial constraints, the IWC de-
cided in 1985 to undertake the revision of member contribution proce-
dures."" For that purpose, an Intersessional Working Group was estab-
lished in 1986.48 The Group suggested the following three alternative
methods: Formula A, where 60% of the budget is divided equally among
member governments and the remaining 40% is distributed by taking the
delegation size into account; Formula B, where the budget is divided by
taking three factors into consideration - membership, aboriginal subsis-
tence whaling activity, and scientific research activity; and Formula C,
the existing method. Although a majority of the member countries backed
Formula A, no consensus was achieved at the 39th Annual Meeting of the
IWC in 1987.17
The weakness of the financial bases of the IWC has put a serious
constraint, inter alia, upon its scientific research ability. The IWC's
budget for research projects during 1976-77 was only LLB100,000 (US
$175,000).118 In 1986, scientific research was funded only at a level of
143. Address by Maurice F. Strong, Fairfield Osborn Memorial Lecture (1973)(unpub-
lished manuscript, The Environment and the New Internationalism 23-24).
144. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 19.1 (1985).
145. Id. at para. 21.
146. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 20.5 (1986).
147. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 23.5 (1987).
148. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg., supra note 113.
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LLB153,00O." 9
According to the U.S. suggestion on the initiation of the IDCR, the
IWC decided in 1976 to establish a voluntary Research Fund for the
IDCR. The United States stated that "although the Research Fund would
give a small start, large funding from bodies such as UNEP would still be
required in this connection." 5 ' However, few contributions have been
made to the Fund by the member countries. For that reason, the idea of
mandatory contributions to the Research Fund was put forward in 1982.
However, the idea failed to win the majority support."'
In 1985, the UNEP indicated that research projects on large
cetaceans should be implemented by the IWC in the Second IDCR as a
contribution to achieve the goals of the Global Plan of Action for the
Conservation of Marine Mammals. The Scientific Committee recognized
that such research projects need to be initiated and funded by the
IWC.' 15 But, most of the member countries were reluctant to contribute
money to the Research Fund for those projects.
Until now, research activities on whale resources in the Antarctic
have been carried out by Japan and the U.S.S.R. under the IDCR. The
research cruises have been open to interested foreign scientists. However,
if some doubt is cast on the objectivity of Japanese research results, an
alternative way should be devised. Under the auspices of the IWC, FAO
or UNEP, and international research team could be organized by highly
qualified scientists and periodically sent to the Antarctic.
Since the adoption of the recommendation for a ten year moratorium
on commercial whaling in the U.N. Stockholm Conference, the UNEP has
stressed the need to increase international research efforts on whales. In
1975, the Governing Council of the UNEP requested that its Executive
Director "support research on marine mammal populations and on whales
and small cetaceans in particular."' 5 3 In 1977, the Governing Council re-
quested that the Executive Director "extend the support, as appropriate,
to research activities with respect to the conservation and effective man-
agement to conserve whales and other cetaceans."' 54 The FAO/UNEP
Global Plan of Action for the Conservation, Management and Utilization
of Marine Mammals was endorsed by the Governing Council in 1984."'
As mentioned earlier, although the Plan of Action was endorsed by the
Scientific Committee of the IWC and the IWC itself, no progress in im-
plementation by the IWC of research projects on large cetaceans has been
made owing to lack of commitment by member governments.
149. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg., supra note 145.
150. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg, supra note 113.
151. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg, supra note 117.
152. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg., supra note 143.
153. United Nations Environmental Programme, Decision 33 of the Governing Council,
May 2, 1975.
154. UNEP, Decision 88 of the Governing Council, May 25, 1977.
155. UNEP, Decision 12/12 of the Governing Council, May 28, 1984.
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There can be no reasonable solution to management problems as long
as disregard for scientific evidence continues. Scientific research is of vital
importance and an essential prerequisite to the IWC's Comprehensive As-
sessment in 1990. What is needed at present is not a subjective but an
objective approach. There is a strong need for independent research
cruises, under the auspices of the appropriate international organization
such as the IWC, FAO, or UNEP, in all areas and seasons, and unrelated
to commercial operations. The IWC, FAO, or UNEP might initiate a
world-wide research program by employing unused whaling vessels to ob-
tain catches for research purposes in all areas inhabited by whales and in
all seasons.
As a matter of lex ferenda, another possible alternative worthwhile
to consider is the strengthening of the management system of whale re-
sources. The idea is to grant ownership of the whales of the world to some
international authority. The authority would be given the power to regu-
late all whaling activities. Dr. George L. Small has stated:
The best method of achieving this would be to grant to some interna-
tional body such as the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
U.N. the sole authority to harvest the whales of the high seas. A
World Whaling Authority could limit the catch of each species to its
sustainable yield, and it could license the required number of whaling
companies needed to achieve that end. Further, the World Whaling
Authority could sell the production of nations with the greatest food
shortage and limit the profit of the licensed companies to a fair and
reasonable level of return on investment. Any excess profits could be
used to support research into better food production methods or
added to the operating budget of the U.N. itself. Only under the pro-
tection of some such international authority can the remaining whales
of the high seas be secure from the threat of extinction and constitute
a perpetual source of food in a world increasingly plagued with
hunger. 6'
In this context, the revision of the ICRW so as to strengthen the
financial base and enhance the scientific research capability of the IWC,
or create a new global management authority in lieu of the IWC, should
be considered. At any rate, all decisions on whales and whaling must be
made on the basis of scientific information and data. International re-
search activities concerning the state of whale resources are a basis for
rational conservation measures. This type of new global management
mechanism should be established under the existing IWC or proposed
authority.
An emotional or political approach to the management problem con-
cerning whales is counterproductive. A whale stock can only be brought
to or maintained at a desired level by the application of a long-term pol-
icy based on the best scientific evidence. Toward the realization of the
156. G. SMALL, supra note 100, at 207-08.
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concept of "ecodevelopment" or "sustainable development," the new
management policy on whales and whaling should be formulated and
adopted by the international community as a whole.
